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Abstract 
 
Even though people perceive their moral judgements as objective and unbiased, 
research suggests that they in fact make biased moral decisions that are then rationalized as 
objective. This project aimed to build on this prior work to further investigate the effect of 
intergroup biases on judgments of others’ morality. In the first line of this project, I aimed to 
investigate whether or not moral judgments are influenced by group membership where there 
is no prior information, beliefs, or emotions associated with the target group (i.e., in a 
minimal group setting). Participants read two versions of trolley dilemmas and judge either 
ingroup or outgroup targets. Across four experimental studies with minimal groups, I found 
evidence for group biases, even though the nature of patterns obtained varied. Overall, the 
findings suggest that group membership has a substantial influence on moral judgments even 
in minimal group settings, but given the inconsistency between the patterns obtained these 
warrant further investigation. Then, I aimed to investigate moral biases in pre-existing groups 
(specifically, men and women) and the role of relevant ideologies (sexism). I specifically 
focused on the role of a type of sexism that directly refers to women’s morality, i.e., 
benevolent sexism. To further specify the role of sexism in moral judgements, I also varied 
the moral extremity of the action. The results indicated that benevolent sexism led to more 
lenient judgements of women who displayed clearly immoral actions, especially among male 
participants (Study 5). However, the interplay between benevolent sexism and moral 
extremity was not moderated by target gender, indicating that this effect is not limited to 
judgements of women’s actions (Study 6). In the final study, I aimed to investigate the role of 
hostile sexism in counter-stereotypical female actions. The results revealed that hostile 
sexism negatively affected moral judgements of women who behaved counter-
stereotypically, but not of men who displayed the same (stereotypically male) behaviour, but 
this was only the case for female participants.  
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1 General Introduction 
We come across moral judgements every day, in the media, in everyday conversation, 
among others. These judgements are sometimes implicit, a gut feeling about what is right and 
wrong, and often feel personal, but nevertheless fairly objective and shared with others. 
These seeming contradictions are at the core of what morality is: A deeply held set of rules 
often so self-evident that they seem objective, but are nevertheless intrinsically linked to 
identities that are shared with some, but not others. My focus in this thesis to examine group 
biases in moral judgements.  
Research suggests that people automatically evaluate everything they perceive, 
including individuals and groups (Zajonc, 1980). Person and group perception have a 
significant impact on future interactions with those individuals and groups that are perceived 
(Boehm, 2008). For example, the evaluation of someone as untrustworthy reduces 
willingness to interact with that person (Bambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013). 
Person and group perceptions are however not necessarily factual or objective. Instead, they 
often involve affective input and motivations that can lead to biased perceptions. For 
example, a classic study found that people make more favourable judgments of others whom 
they expect to interact with than of people they do not expect to meet (Darley & Berscheid, 
1967).  
Just as person perception can be biased by preconceived beliefs and motivations, 
group perceptions are guided by pre-existing stereotypes. For example, the Stereotype 
Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) proposes that different outgroups are 
associated with specific stereotypes, which in turn drive emotions and influence behaviour, 
including moral judgments. For example, research has shown that the acceptability of 
sacrificing lives to save other lives depended on whether those sacrificed were outgroup 
members and those saved were ingroup members (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris & Fiske, 2010). 
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In fact, a very recent study examining changes in moral values between 1900 and 2007 has 
shown a steady increase in ingroup-based morality with time (Wheeler, McGrath, & Haslam, 
2019), underlining the timely need to improve our understanding of group biases in moral 
judgements.  
In this thesis, I take on board existing knowledge about the flexibility of moral 
judgments, leading to biases that can have severe consequences for certain groups in society. 
My overall aim is to advance understanding of how moral judgements might be influenced by 
group biases and associated factors. To do so, I bring together insights from moral 
psychology with findings from social psychology. I started by examining group biases in 
moral judgments in a minimal group paradigm, to investigate group biases in groups that are 
not associated with specific meanings, histories, or ideologies. Then, I proceeded by 
examining group biases in real social groups (i.e., men and women) and whether associated 
ideologies (i.e., sexism) interfere with intergroup biases.  
In Chapter 2, I review the literature on which my research was based. I start by 
defining morality and continue by discussing existing theory and evidence bearing on the 
aspects of morality I address in this thesis.  
In Chapter 3, I report four studies examining the effect of group membership on moral 
judgments in a minimal group setting. I also examine the role of group identification and type 
of action (i.e., moral dilemma).  
In Chapter 4, I report three studies examining whether sexism affects moral 
judgments of women as a function of the moral extremity of the action (i.e., how immoral the 
action is). I was specifically interested in investigating whether the role of benevolent sexist 
attitudes toward women can be triggered in actions that do not directly bear on the gender 
hierarchy.  
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Chapter 5 provides a summary of my findings in relation to the overarching research 
questions of this research. I conclude by discussing the limitations of this research, and 
directions for the future.  
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2 Literature Review 
Research has shown that, though we evaluate others’ actions in different domains 
such competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 2002), evaluations of people’s moral virtue seem 
to be primary (Abele & Wojiszke, 2007; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Brambilla, Rusconi, 
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Van Lange & De Bruin, 2000). Specifically, moral traits such as 
trust score highest among the characteristics people seek in others (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 
2007) and those perceived as moral are also perceived as most deserving (Brambilla & Riva, 
2016). Of course all domains of impression formation play a role in our evaluations of a 
person and can be primary in particular situations, but individuals seem to seek and value 
most information about another person’s morality (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). For example, 
being deficient in sociability might not lead to ostracism or punishment in a society whereas 
lacking in morality undoubtedly comes with consequences, ranging from ostracism to prison 
sentences (Opotow, 1990; Van der Lee, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Rutjens, 2017). In sum, 
morality is a critical domain of social judgement and one that can be very consequential. If 
so, it seems crucial to understand how morality functions and whether moral judgements can 
be biased, potentially leading to the biased and undeserved social spread of sanctions. But 
what exactly is morality? 
2.1. What is Morality? 
 
In everyday language, the word ‘morality’ broadly refers to a socially shared system 
of values and principles that distinguishes between what is right and wrong. As a system, 
morality can be defined as sets of rules, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, and 
psychological mechanisms that work together to supress selfishness and maintain a 
cooperative and coherent social life (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). This set of moral 
norms is unique to each society and each member of a specific society is expected to live by 
these norms. Abidance to a society’s moral system is monitored through regular evaluations 
16 
 
 
of individual actions, individuals, or groups—moral judgements (Haidt, 2001). When 
individuals or groups fail to meet these moral rules, they are condemned, criticized, or even 
excluded from the society. Moral guidelines impose a social contract that does not need to be 
formalized or written, but is often reflected and reinforced by formal procedures and 
institutions (legal, religious or political). Irrespective of whether or not they are formalized, 
the main function of these guidelines is the same: To supress selfishness and promote 
prosocial behaviour.  
Selfishness and pro-sociality are understood by reference to how the self is defined 
(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). Within groups and societies, pro-sociality 
emerges from coordination within the group and selfishness is about the failure to do that. 
When more groups are taken into account, pro-sociality can be bounded by group lines, in 
that to favour a competitor is not likely to be perceived as moral (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & 
Reicher, 2005; Levine & Thomson, 2004)—though to help a more disadvantaged group 
might be (Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014). In this way, moral guidelines serve to 
regulate the behaviour of individuals within their own group, but also towards other groups, 
in a complex and often nuanced system that prescribes what is right or wrong.  
Some argue that there are universal moral principles that apply to all cultures, people 
and time periods. In this vein, cross-cultural differences in what is deemed moral are 
considered superficial, or not core to morality. These universalist approach seeks 
commonalities across cultures, which, in turn, suggests a relatively systematic and non-
discriminative set of moral rules focused on judgements of harm and justice (Turiel, 1983). 
Specifically, those who hold a universalist approach propose that there is only one true moral 
guideline, which applies to everyone and to which everyone ought to adhere. Early moral 
development theories supported this universalist standpoint by suggesting that moral 
development is realised in pre-determined ordered stages that are equal for everyone 
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(Kohlberg, 1963). Although this approach acknowledged differences across cultures and 
individuals, it ranks those differences as developmental stages, adding up to only one 
superior sense of morality that applies to all people.  
By contrast, relativists focus more on the ways in which moral principles vary across 
groups or societies. One of the first and loudest voices in opposition to universalist 
approaches was Carol Gilligan (1983), who suggested that following Kohlberg’s theory 
women would be judged as less moral than men. In her book, “In a different voice”, Gillian 
claims that Kohlberg’s approach is ‘male-centric’ and fails to take into account women’s 
values and priorities. Although Gillian’s views have been criticized, and subsequent research 
could not find gender differences in moral reasoning, the work of scholars such as Gilligan 
have highlighted that moral judgements can be based on more than one type of consideration 
and can therefore vary across individuals and groups in meaningful ways that do not merely 
reflect developmental stages. Moral relativism (also called ‘moral pluralism’) therefore 
pointed to the importance of examining differences in what is deemed as moral, paving the 
way for more recent interest in the examination of moral reasoning  in intergroup contexts 
(Graham & Haidt, 2010).  
When individuals deviate from their society’s mores, they are penalized harshly to 
maintain societal order and cohesion (Balliet, Mulder, Van Lange, 2011; Fehr & Gachter, 
2002; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Wu, Balliet & Van Lange, 2016). However, there are times 
when members of the same society cannot agree on what qualifies as moral, or even on how 
to apply certain moral principles (Monin & Jordan, 2008). For example, members of religious 
sub-groups in a society might have different dress codes or dietary requirements that their 
followers ought to comply with. Although transgression of these rules might be deemed 
morally wrong by one sub-group, this might not be shared by other sub-groups in the same 
society. That is, moral guidelines serve their regulatory function by driving evaluations of 
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actions, individuals, and groups as moral or immoral, which in turn leads to sanctions for 
behaviour considered immoral (Ellemers & van den Bos, 2012; Sleebos, Ellemers, & de 
Glider, 2006). Deviance is thus defined by comparing individuals’ behaviour against the 
group’s moral guidelines (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). It stands to reason that when 
individuals or groups hold different ideas about what qualifies as moral, then they also hold 
different beliefs about what qualifies as deviant.  
How people make moral judgements and how these often converge but sometimes 
diverge has been the focus of a growing body of work. Though many psychological theories 
include aspects related to morality (e.g., social psychological theories linking norms to 
attitudes and behaviour), only a smaller set of theories is explicitly concerned with moral 
judgements. Theories have differed in their focus, a broad category of theories focusing more 
on the content or motives of moral judgements, while others focus on the routes through 
which people arrive at those judgements, and yet others at how these judgements pan out in 
and are affected by social contexts. In what follows, I briefly review some of the most 
important theories proposed to examine these issues and some key the evidence they have 
generated.   
2.2. Moral Motives: Beyond Harm and Justice 
 
 As argued, early moral psychology research tended to treat morality as a one universal 
set of rules which can be applied to any moral situation in question. Universalist researchers 
developed their theories around the idea that morality concerns beliefs about harm and 
justice. However, it has been refuted by pluralistic and relativist researchers, such as Gillian, 
who indicated that there is more to morality than just these two concerns. Here I review some 
of the most important theories which extend morality beyond harm and justice.  
One of the theories that aims to define the content or motives underlying moral 
judgements was developed by Shweder (1990). This author proposed that there are three 
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different ways of talking about morality that shape moral decision making, which are called 
as the big three of ethical discourse: 1) The ethics of autonomy, which taps into the concepts 
of harm, fairness, and justice and aims to protect the autonomy of individuals during their 
interpersonal relations; 2) The ethics of community, which is related to the concepts of duty, 
respect, and loyalty and aims to regulate the social order within a community, therefore 
enabling the groups to maintain their cohesion and coordination over time; and 3) The ethics 
of divinity is related to sanctity and sin and aims to preserve the purity of each individual. 
Shweder (1991) suggests that cultural norms and culturally shaped thoughts and emotions 
affect the moral decision making process. For example a study with Brazilian and US 
samples found that people from low vs. high socio-economic status used these three moral 
discourses differently when judging harmless but offensive actions (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 
1993). Similarly, another study indicated that college students relied more on the ethics of 
autonomy while older people were more willing to talk about issues related to the ethics of 
community and divinity (Arnett & Balle-Jensen, 1993). In this sense, what this theory 
suggests is that moral judgments are sensitive to cultural norms and cannot be evaluated 
without taking the cultural context into account.  
A similar approach was developed by Rai and Fiske (2011) who conceptualized four 
moral motives regulating interpersonal relations. This theory argues that different kinds of 
social relationships entail different moral obligations and prohibitions that should be 
examined in order to understand moral judgments and moral disagreements. A. Fiske 
suggested that moral judgements are driven by different moral motives that are embedded in 
social-relational schemas, the activation of which can vary depending on the situation and the 
individual: 1) Unity, which is related to the issues aroused by the fact that people live in 
social groups and need to maintain cohesion within the group; 2) hierarchy, which is based on 
respect to authority and loyalty to higher status group members; 3) equality matching, which 
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promotes fairness and justice between individuals and between groups; and 4) market pricing, 
which is related to rewards and punishments based on a utilitarian cost and benefit 
calculation. In support of this theory, a series of experiments has shown that priming the 
social-relational schemas led to activation of certain moral motives. For example, priming 
group relationships as communal and sharing led to activation of unity related motives, while 
priming a relational frame based on authority led to activation of hierarchy motives (Rai, 
2012). The theory argues that moral judgments are based on evaluations of others as 
prospects for social relations and tries to specifically explain the cases where an agent’s 
intentions are not taken into account by an observer who evaluating their action. In this way, 
according to the theory, it could be possible that an action involving violence or unequal 
treatment might be deemed as morally right depending on which relational motives are 
activated and what is the relevant relational structure. Overall, although these motives are 
proposed to be universal, Fiske claims that there is a difference in when and how these 
motives are activated across cultures, religious groups, and ideologies.  
Haidt and Joseph’s (2004) moral foundations theory aims to synthesize and integrate 
different moral theories in a broader theory of morality. Moral foundations theory addresses 
cultural differences in morality by reference to the idea that morality is not just about 
judgements of harm and fairness, but there are various other foundations that morality is built 
on: 1) The first foundation is related to the avoidance of harm and promotes care and warmth 
towards others; 2) The second foundation is fairness, which refers to concerns about cheating 
and unfairness among people; 3) The third foundation is loyalty and focuses on concerns 
about on threads and challenges one’s ingroup disrespectful behaviours and betrayal of 
authorities; 4) The fourth foundation is authority, which refers to concerns about hierarchy 
and respect for authorities 5) The fifth is purity and aims to prevent degradation and promote 
wholesomeness and sanctity of individuals in a society. Finally, 6) the sixth foundation is 
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liberty and refers to concerns about oppression and corruption related to abuse of power. 
Studies testing this model have shown that different groups (e.g., religious groups, national 
groups, and people with different political ideologies) utilize or prioritise different moral 
foundations when making their moral judgements. For example, a study comparing 
conservatives and liberals in a US sample, found that liberals prioritised harm and fairness 
foundations when making moral judgements about a range of political issues, whereas 
conservatives were more likely to use all five foundations when making these judgements 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Haidt and colleagues have suggested that moral foundation 
theory can explain how ideologies that are seen by some people as problematic can be 
perceived as perfectly moral by other people: It is not that some people are happy to be 
immoral, but that ideologies can shape what foundations are prioritised when making moral 
judgements. Interestingly, foundations such as loyalty can both be used as a basis to promote 
cohesion and a basis for racism, nationalism, and prejudice towards outgroups, and authority 
can justify respectful treatment, but also oppression (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007).  
2.3. Routes to Moral Judgements 
 
A second category of theoretical approaches focuses on the routes through which 
moral judgements are made. The earliest attempts to explain moral judgments came from 
philosophers (like Hutcheson, Hume, Smith) who suggested that moral judgements are led by 
our inner moral sense and immediate emotional reactions to the eliciting situations. 
According to emotion philosophers, reason is the ability to calculate the odds and the best 
means to a preferred outcome. Therefore, it is an instrument to understand that certain actions 
might lead to certain moral or immoral results. However, moral judgments are themselves 
based on our own sentimental interests and passions.  
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Later, Hume, and other scholars who supported this idea, were refuted by rationalist 
philosophers (like Kant, Leibniz, Descartes) who suggested that although emotions aroused 
can guide our moral reasoning, in the end we draw moral judgements from rational evidence 
we gather from the environment. In this rational context, it is conceptualized that human 
morality is shaped by certain abstract rational moral principles that people ought to comply 
with. This approach to morality gained extensive support from the early psychology research 
(specifically cognitive developmental researchers like Kohlberg, Piaget, Turiel), where moral 
judgments are led by a rational process as consisting of deliberate reasoning leading to moral 
behaviours.  
The most influential rationalist theory was developed by Kohlberg, who argued that 
human morality develops through stages that require certain cognitive abilities to be 
developed in order to go to the next stage (1969). This idea that cognitive and moral 
development progress in tandem suggests that human morality is led by deliberate and 
controlled processes. Therefore, moral judgments can be made in a similar way as we make 
judgements about the physical world, where things are either right or wrong. In Kohlberg’s 
moral development theory, the last stage is justice, which is viewed as the ultimate virtue. 
Therefore, one cannot be truly moral unless they are proved to be just in terms of Kohlberg’s 
moral theory.  
Kohlberg’s theory has been criticized due to its limited conceptualization of human 
morality, specifically disregarding the voice of female morality (Gilligan, 1983). Blasi (1983) 
also criticized Kohlberg’s theory because of its neglect of the effect of the moral self and 
social dispositions when making moral judgments. What Kohlberg suggest is that there is a 
responsible self who is aware of moral principles and, therefore, acts upon them. However, 
Blasi proposes the Self Model of moral action which stresses the relevance of the moral self 
in moral judgements and actions. Blasi (1980) argued that human morality is more than 
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deontic morals (judgements and actions), but rather it is an interplay between controlled 
conscious and emotional unconscious psychological mechanisms shaped by experiences 
(Blasi, 1983). Blasi’s self-model of moral action broadens the understanding of moral 
judgments and opens the way to exploring the alternative routes to moral judgments (Narvaez 
& Lapsley, 2009).  
Following Blasi’s idea, Haidt (2001) proposed the Social Intuitionist Model where 
moral judgments are product of both moral intuitions and moral reasoning. It has been argued 
that people always make their moral judgments based on their moral intuitions, which is a 
quick reaction to a morally eliciting situation. This can then be followed by the slower and 
more deliberate moral reasoning that rationalizes the moral judgement that was initially 
regulated by moral intuition. Haidt supported his model with empirical evidence showing that 
affective responses were a better predictor of moral judgments than reasoning. For example, a 
study examining the reactions to sexual moral issues which did not involve harm 
(homosexuality, incest and different form of masturbation) among liberals and conservatives 
found that initial affective reactions predicted the moral judgments better than the perceptions 
of harmfulness (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). Later, in another study (Björklund, Haidt, & Murphy, 
2000) participants were asked to provide reasoning to their initial moral judgments of 
harmless but disgusting moral dilemmas. However, those who judged the scenarios as 
immoral were not able to explain their reasoning (moral dumbfounding) but they nevertheless 
did not change their initial moral judgments. Another study found that there was a 
disassociation between people’s moral judgements and their justification of the judgment, 
indicating that people failed to justify their reasoning (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & 
Mikhail, 2007). This research indicates that moral judgements can be arrived at through ‘gut 
feelings’, that is, immediate and intuitive reactions to (im)moral situations, and that, at least 
sometimes, subsequent moral reasoning might fail to happen.  
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Additional evidence that moral judgements are not necessarily arrived at purely by 
reference to rational standards comes from research by Greene and colleagues (2001). Using 
MRI to track brain activity, these researchers found that certain moral dilemmas trigger 
activity in brain areas that are associated with social emotional processing while other types 
of moral dilemmas (and non-moral) trigger activity in brain areas that are associated with 
working memory controlled decision making. In addition to demonstrating that people can 
arrive at moral decisions through more emotional or through more rational routes, these 
findings suggest that one important factor that affects which route leads to moral decision 
making is the characteristic of the action being judged. That is, they suggested that 
characteristics of the action being judged can determine whether the moral judgement is 
arrived at through emotional or purely rational processes.  
Green and colleagues further differentiated between personal and impersonal actions. 
An action is seen as personal if it meets these three criteria: 1) It is likely to cause serious 
bodily harm, 2) to a particular person, 3) in such a way that the harm does not come from the 
deflection of an existing threat onto a different party. If an action does not meet these criteria, 
it is seen as impersonal. In a series of follow up studies, Greene and colleagues (2001) 
manipulated the characteristics of the action to clarify how these affect moral decision 
making processes. Their research suggested that a personal-moral action is consistently 
perceived as less moral than an impersonal-moral (and non-moral). Studies have 
subsequently found that whether an action is personal or impersonal can trigger activity in 
different areas of the brain, suggesting that different processes are involved in moral decision 
making referring to these actions—personal actions being associated with emotional 
processes and impersonal actions being associated with more controlled and effortful 
processes.  
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On the basis of these findings, Greene (2009) developed the dual process model of 
moral judgements. This model describes how particular moral dilemmas involve different 
types of moral decision making processes. For instance, Greene (2009) describes the different 
processes involved in the moral judgements people make when considering different train 
track dilemmas, where the agent in the scenario has to decide on a trade-off between one 
person and five people on the train tracks. Moral psychology widely uses these trolley 
dilemmas that are easily modifiable to manipulate specific factors (e.g., factors regarding the 
action, or of the agent and or the victim) to test specific research questions (Greene, 2008; 
Mikhail, 2011). In one version of this scenario (footbridge), the agent tries to stop the train by 
shoving a fat man off the footbridge. Since this involves a direct intervention, it qualifies as a 
personal action and it has been shown to trigger judgements driven by emotional processes in 
the brain: Greene (2009) designates this judgement as intuitive emotional processing. 
However, in another version of this scenario (switch), the agent tries to stop the train by 
switching the train towards a track where there is only one person. Participants perceive this 
action as impersonal and therefore rate it as more moral than the footbridge scenario. This is 
designated as controlled cognitive process.  
Despite the claims and evidence put forth by Greene and colleagues, Hauser (2006) 
argues that in any moral decision cognitive process take the lead, feeding the intuition and 
finally triggering emotions. Therefore, the model that Hauser (2006) suggests is not that 
different moral decisions are related to different (cognitive or emotional) moral processes, but 
that cognitive and emotional processes are inter-related and both contribute to moral decision 
making  
2.4. The Social Context of Moral Judgements 
 
The theories reviewed above focus on what types of beliefs drive moral judgements 
and the routes through which these operate. Research has also examined how morality works 
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in social context and how factors that characterise social contexts might affect moral 
judgements. For example, while many researchers have suggested that the most important 
function of morality is to promote prosocial behaviour, it is clear that this is bounded by 
social categorizations as people are more likely to show altruism towards ingroup members 
than towards outgroup members (e.g., Batson et al., 1995; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). In 
addition, what is considered pro-social is likely to differ across groups, or societies, because 
they are likely to prioritise different moral norms (Haidt, 2008; Sachdeva, Singh, & Medin, 
2011).  
Groups are regulated by a variety of norms, not all of which are deep moral 
convictions (Skitka, 2010) and the extent to which norms influence group members’ 
behaviour relies on the extent to which they are seen as moral. For example, groups can have 
norms that regulate task performance, as well as norms that regulate cheating—and the latter 
is likely to be considered more of a moral issue. Research has shown that norms framed in 
moral terms are more powerful regulators of ingroup members’ behaviour than norms framed 
in competence terms. For example, studies have shown that group members are more likely 
to follow ingroup norms framed in moral terms than in competence terms (Pagliaro, 
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011) and that they are more protective of the ingroup’s reputation 
when an ingroup member displays immoral than an incompetent behaviour (Marques, 
Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). 
The reason why the moral framing of group norms is so potent is that people are 
motivated to see themselves and their group as highly moral (and more so than highly 
competent; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2008), both because morality is central to the self-
concept and because they are likely to anticipate harsher sanctions when they behave 
immorally than when they behave incompetently (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). In 
addition, morality is expected to be a more fixed or immutable characteristic than other traits 
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such as competence (Pagliaro, Ellemers, Barreto, & Di Cesare, 2016), motivating people to 
avoid being seen as immoral—since ‘once immoral, always immoral’. Perhaps because of 
this, but also because another person’s morality indicates whether they can be expected to be 
benevolent or threatening, research has shown that people prefer others who are seen as 
moral and avoid those who are perceived to lack moral qualities to a greater extent than those 
who lack sociability or competence (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Brambilla, Sacchi, Menegatti, 
& Moscatelli, 2016). In addition, groups only regulate the behaviour of ingroup (vs. 
outgroup) members (Gollwitzer & Keller, 2010)—and indeed, people care more about what 
their ingroup deems moral than about what other groups deem moral (Ellemers & van den 
Bos, 2012).  
Importantly, studies have also shown that, contrary to what has been argued by 
Greene (2008), but consistent with Haidt’s ideas (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), the 
very same action can be judged very differently depending on local norms (or cultures), who 
engages in that action, or who its target is. The next section expands on these biases in moral 
judgements.  
2.5. Biases in Moral Judgements 
 
All in all, the work reviewed in the previous section suggests that moral judgements 
are flexible and responsive to contextual features, rather that driven purely by rigid principles 
or particular characteristics of the action. That also suggests that, if this is so, then moral 
judgements are not in themselves necessarily moral—if we consider fairness central to our 
conceptualization of morality—but very open to group and ideological biases. 
There is ample evidence showing how different types of intergroup biases can lead to 
unequal treatment based on social group membership (Batson et al., 1995; Blair, Judd, & 
Cheapleau, 2004; Correll, Park, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2007; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-
Vaughns & Johnson, 2006; Mealy, Stephan, & Urrutia, 2007; Mifune, Hashimoto & 
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Yamagishi, 2010; Valdesolo, & DeSteno, 2007). A meta-analysis on intergroup bias by 
Bettencourt et al. (2001) showed that ingroup bias occurs even when people were merely 
categorized into different groups. However, the research on intergroup biases has mostly 
focused on sociability and competence judgements of different groups, or of individuals from 
different groups. In this body of work, it has been shown that people rate the ingroup as more 
sociable and competent than the outgroup. However, bias in morality ratings has not been 
examined, although there are studies that suggest that biases occur in morality domain as 
well. For example, one study showed that the acceptability of lying for Euro-Americans and 
Ecuadorians depended on what the intention of the liar was perceived to be (self-promoting 
vs. other-oriented), who was lying (ingroup vs. outgroup), to whom (ingroup vs. outgroup), 
and what the cultural orientation of the perceiver was (collectivist vs. individualistic) (Mealy, 
et al., 2007; see also Ellemers, et al., 2019; Haidt, 2001). Beside cultural context, 
experimental work by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) also showed that even in a minimal 
group setting the very same behaviour (an unequal distribution of resources) was judged 
more harshly when it was displayed by an outgroup member than when it was displayed by 
an ingroup member. Given the fact that moral judgements might have serious consequences 
for individuals and some groups, it is very important to examine how biases emerge in this 
domain.  
 Biases are not just driven by ingroup-outgroup differences, they can also be driven by 
specific political ideologies. For instance, endorsement of social dominance orientation is 
found to be related several different types of group based biases (e.g., racism, sexism, ageism. 
see Sidanus & Pratto, 1999). In a similar vein, when asked about the appropriateness of the 
killing of civilians during war, American participants’ moral judgements depended on the 
group membership of the victim: Conservatives were more likely to endorse the killing of 
civilians when these were Iraqi than when they were American, whereas liberals were not 
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affected by the group membership of the victim (Uhlmann, Pizzaro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 
2009). Research also suggests that the endorsement of patriarchal attitudes towards women 
can moderate the link between offender’s gender and moral judgements. The next section 
elaborates on what is already known about this.  
2.6. How Sexism Affects Moral Judgments 
 
Undoubtedly, one expects that moral principles applied by a higher legal institution 
should not be affected by biases. However, there is ample evidence of institutional biases, as 
well as biases made by individuals representing legal authorities. For example, research has 
shown that stereotypes of Black targets as criminals drives bias against Black (vs. White) 
targets in shooting decisions (Correll, Park, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2007). Similarly, the more 
stereotypically Black a defendant was the more likely to be judged as deserving death penalty 
when the victim was White than (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns & Johnson, 2006). 
Consistent with this evidence, Labour MP David Lammy (2017) recently pointed to the 
pervasiveness of racial discrimination against Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (‘BAME’) 
people in the British criminal justice system, highlighting how important it is to examine the 
relationship between prejudice and moral judgements in this national context too.  
 Prejudice and biases in moral judgements are not limited to race. Research also 
suggests that an offender’s gender might affect sentencing judgements, though evidence from 
this line of research is mixed. The first account, drawn from Chivalry Theory, suggests that 
women are treated more leniently than men by the justice system (Doerner & Demuth, 2010; 
Koons-Witt, 2002; Tillyer, Hartley, & Ward, 2015). This theory suggests that women are less 
likely to be arrested or detained compared to men, for the same crime. By contrast, there are 
also accounts suggesting that women are treated more harshly than men by the justice system 
because punishment decisions are made within a male dominated criminal system (Chesney-
Lind, 1999, Heidesohn, 1989). There is evidence in support of both theories but that the 
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specific pattern of bias depends on other factors. Experimental studies indicated that there 
might be several different factors moderating this link between gender and moral judgements, 
or punishment (Herzog & Oreg, 2008; Masser, Lee, & McKimmie, 2010). One factor is the 
gender stereotypicality of the female offender, or her behaviour, or the extent to which she 
(or her behaviour) conforms to traditional female stereotypes. Indeed, research found that 
when female offenders portrayed a more stereotypically female image (i.e., being a caregiver) 
they were given more lenient treatment than when they did not present themselves as 
feminine (Herzog & Oreg, 2008; Koons-Witt, 2002).  
 
Sexism cam be defined as an ideology that aims to regulate women’s actions in order 
to maintain the patriarchal system were men are granted higher status than women. 
Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) suggests that sexism can be expressed in 
different ways, rooted in the same underlying belief that women are inferior to men. Hostile 
sexism expresses this belief through antagonism towards women who challenge the status 
quo (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). Benevolent sexism, on the other hand, 
idealizes women as incompetent, but demure, domestic, and moral (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 
1997, 2011; Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997; Glick et al., 2000; Jackman, 1999; 
Krys et al., 2018; Leach, Carraro, Garcia, & Kang, 2015; Shields, 2007). Importantly, in line 
with the descriptive and prescriptive function of gender stereotypes (Glick & Rudman, 2010), 
benevolent and hostile sexism work in tandem to regulate women’s behaviour and bring it in 
line with traditional gender roles. Specifically, benevolent sexism idealizes traditional women 
and rewards women who behave traditionally, whereas hostile sexism punishes women who 
deviate from this traditional ideal (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997, 2011; Glick, Wilkerson & 
Cuffe, 2015; Wilkerson, 2014).  
Research on sexism and moral judgments has suggested that endorsement of sexist 
attitudes predicts harsher judgments of women who do not comply with gender expectations. 
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For instance, a study by Sakalli-Ugurlu and Glick (2003) found that sexist beliefs 
(specifically benevolent sexism) predicted a harsher judgment of women involved in pre-
marital sex. In a similar vein, a study examining the effect of sexist attitudes on judgements 
of rape victims found that endorsement of benevolent sexism was associated with victim 
blame when the victims were counter-stereotypical (Masser, Lee, & McKimmie, 2010). 
Aside from illustrating the effect of sexism on moral judgements, these findings suggest that 
benevolent sexism is particularly relevant in this context, which makes sense since it is 
benevolent sexism that refers to women’s superior moral sensibility. That is, benevolent 
sexism idealizes women as morally pure and superior to men in moral sensibility, while 
hostile sexism does not speak to women’s morality. It is therefore a form of sexism that 
inherently involves both the expectation that women are moral (descriptive stereotype) and 
the imperative that they should be so (prescriptive stereotype).   
In summary, though research appears to support the idea that sexism moderates moral 
judgements of female targets, results are somewhat inconsistent and in need of further 
exploration. Besides, research examining the effect of benevolent sexism on moral 
judgements has mostly focused on sexual abuse and harassment, or actions clearly violating 
gender roles or traditional views of women as pure and demure (e.g., murder, pre-marital 
sex). These behaviours have direct bearings on the power relations between men and women 
(reflecting it and reinforcing it) and therefore also on the gender hierarchy. Would benevolent 
sexism have similar effects when the target action does not necessarily have such 
implications? When actions have a bearing on the gender hierarchy, the link between sexist 
beliefs and moral judgements seems relatively self-evident. I additionally propose that, since 
benevolent sexism idealizes women as morally pure and superior, any immoral action by a 
female might be, by definition, considered as breaching gender roles or traditional views of 
women. Evidence for this proposal is as yet lacking. In addition, it is as yet unclear whether 
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benevolent sexism shapes moral judgements by making it less hard to detect immorality in 
women, or by making immoral behaviour seem more problematic.  
2.7. Overview of This Research 
 
In summary, research on biases in moral judgments highlights the significance of the 
context of the action being judged (e.g., who the agent is, or who the victim is). However, it 
is also important to see whether these effects would be present in a minimal intergroup 
context where there is no prior information or no stereotype content present, so as to 
distinguish mere categorization effects from effects that are driven by historical relationships 
between groups, or associated ideologies. Therefore, in the first part of this thesis (Studies 1-
4 reported in Chapter 3), I focus on whether moral judgments are moderated by group 
membership. In these studies, I also examine whether or not group identification plays a role 
in this link, drawing on ample evidence that group identification often moderates intergroup 
biases (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1998; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; 
Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Sidanus, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994; Terry & Hogg, 1996; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, & Smith, 1984).  
Moreover, the present research aims to bring social psychology research and moral 
psychology approaches together. As argued above, moral psychology research suggests that 
factors such as intention to harm, or direct (personal) intervention between the person who 
causes the harm and the victim, influence moral decision making. To test whether intergroup 
biases in moral judgments depend on characteristics of the action examined within moral 
psychology, Studies 1-4 use two trolley dilemmas that have been shown to vary in their 
permissibility: The switch (more permissible) and the footbridge (less permissible) scenarios. 
Based on ample research with minimal groups that has revealed ingroup biases in other 
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domains (Bettencourt, Kelly, Nancy, & Hume, 2001). I expect to find group biases in moral 
judgements in these scenarios, using minimal group categorizations.  
Another goal of this research is to examine biases in moral judgements in real groups, 
where group categorization comes together with specific relationship patterns, meanings, and 
history. In Studies 5-7 (reported in Chapter 5), I focus on gender categorization (and 
specifically on men vs. women) and examine the extent to which moral judgments are 
influenced by target and perceiver gender, and by group-based ideologies, in this case, sexist 
attitudes towards women. I propose that since benevolent sexism idealizes women as morally 
pure and superior to men, immoral actions displayed by women would be perceived as 
violating traditional gender roles and therefore moral judgements of women should be 
affected by the extent to which perceivers endorse benevolent sexism. Though there is no 
research I can directly draw on to draw hypotheses, two possibilities seem consistent with 
existing knowledge. First, since benevolent sexism is associated with the idea that women are 
moral, endorsing benevolent sexism might lead perceivers to give female targets (compared 
to male targets) the benefit of the doubt, raising the threshold for perceiving them as immoral. 
By contrast, benevolent sexism is also associated with the strong prescription that women 
ought to be moral. As such, endorsement of benevolent sexism can be associated with harsher 
judgements of female targets who behave immorally. I propose that the factor moderating 
these contrasting predictions is the extent to which the action to be judged is clearly immoral. 
I expect that endorsement of benevolent sexism is likely to be associated with harsher 
judgements when the action is clearly immoral, but with more lenient judgements when the 
action is not so immoral. 
These proposals will be examined in the following chapters and discussed in the last 
chapter of this thesis. 
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3 Moral Biases in Minimal Groups 
Ingroup favoritism has been widely examined in social psychology (Billig & Tajfel, 
1973; Cikara et al., 2010; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1999; Tajfel, 1974; Valdesolo & 
DeSteneo, 2007), showing that people judge their in-groups as more sociable and more 
competent than out-groups. Here, we focus on in-group bias in the domain of morality, which 
has recently been recognized as one of the most important dimensions for one’s evaluations 
of their group (Abele & Wojiszke, 2007; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Brambilla, Rusconi, 
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Van Lange & De Bruin, 2000). Therefore, here we aimed to 
investigate whether ingroup biases occur in moral judgements.   
The present research aims to examine biases in moral judgements in specific moral 
dilemmas (the footbridge and the switch) that have been widely used by moral psychology to 
investigate moral decision-making. A dimension that has been identified as crucial for moral 
judgments in moral psychology is whether the action requires active intervention or not when 
one is making their moral decision. Research has shown that people find harmful actions 
more acceptable if they do not require active intervention—impersonal moral action than if 
they require an active intervention—personal moral action (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001).  
Research using these scenarios indicated that actions bearing on moral judgements 
can be supported by different processes in the brain, depending on characteristics of the 
action itself (e.g., whether the action is personal or impersonal). These studies showed that 
the characteristic of the action can lead to more automatic or more controlled judgements 
(Greene et al., 2001). Therefore, moral psychology suggests that these dilemmas tap into 
specific moral reasoning processes with the implication that responses tend to be easily 
predicted from the scenario itself. For example, pushing someone off a footbridge to stop a 
train, thereby killing the patient but saving the lives of five people—an action that is highly 
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personal—was judged as less acceptable than switching a train track, without directly acting 
upon someone, but causing the train to kill them and miss five other people. While these two 
actions have the same consequences (one-to-five trade off), the first action involves a direct 
personal force by the agent, which triggers an emotional automatic response, and is therefore 
judged as less acceptable by most participants (Greene et al., 2001).  
A study examining the biases driven by political ideologies in these moral dilemmas 
(Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009) found that American participants’ moral 
judgements depended on the group membership of the victim. Specifically, they found that 
Conservatives were more likely to endorse the killing of civilians when these were Iraqi than 
when they were American, whereas liberals were not affected by the group membership of 
the victim. Although the study by Uhlmann and colleagues (2009) focused on an important 
intergroup context, it did not take into account variables that can function as important 
moderators in these contexts. Specifically, research on intergroup relations has suggested that 
identification is a powerful moderator of group-based evaluations, so it is possible that it also 
functions as a moderator of moral judgements in intergroup contexts.  
Social identities derived from social group memberships are an important part of 
one’s self-concept. Because people want to maintain a positive self-concept, they are inclined 
to positively evaluate their social groups in comparison with an out-group, and this tendency, 
in part, underlies in-group bias (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 2004). A meta-analysis on 
intergroup bias by Bettencourt et al. (2001) showed that ingroup bias occurs even when 
people were merely categorized into different groups. In relation to morality, there have been 
studies investigating the effect of group membership directly on moral judgements (morally 
acceptability of an action). For example, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) looked at moral 
judgements of an immoral action (distributing resources unfairly to their own group) as a 
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function of group membership. They found that people rated ingroup targets as more moral 
than outgroup targets.  
However, there is also evidence that people judge outgroups more favorably than 
their own membership group (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Research has found that 
actions performed by ingroup members can significantly affect the ingroup’s reputation, 
leading group members to derogate ingroup members who behave in negative ways even 
more than they derogate an outgroup member who displays the same behavior (Marques & 
Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). This might be seen as a strategic 
expression of ingroup favoritism since it helps the ingroup to boost their positive image by 
distancing itself from deviant ingroup members (Marquez, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001).  
Although these two strategies stem from the same underlying motivation (to protect positive 
evaluations of one’s own group), there might be another factor which causes these different 
responses of group members to ingroup deviants. Social identity theory (Turner & Brown, 
1978) suggests that the fate of the ingroup is more important to individual group members 
who have more strongly internalized the group as part of their social identity. i.e., those who 
identify highly with the group (Turner, 1999). Indeed, research has suggested that low 
identifiers behave differently from high identifiers (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 
1993; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Jetten, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1997; Sidanus, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994; Terry & Hogg, 1996). These studies 
mostly indicated that low identifiers were less likely to behave normatively than group 
members who were highly identified with the ingroup. Therefore, the present study aims to 
investigate the function of identification on moral judgement.  
Our research therefore examines the role of group membership in moral judgements 
in intergroup contexts, for personal vs. impersonal moral actions, using the footbridge and the 
switch scenarios as examples of personal (reflecting automatic processes) and impersonal 
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(reflecting controlled processes) actions. Research on bias in other dimensions has suggested 
a tendency to favor ingroup over outgroup (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Cikara et al., 2010; Tajfel 
et al., 1971; Turner, 1999; Tajfel, 1972; Valdesolo & DeSteneo, 2007). Therefore, we 
hypothesized that the ingroup target’s action is judged as more moral than the same action by 
an outgroup target (Hypothesis 1) – main effect of group membership. Second, we aim to 
examine whether this occurs for different actions (e.g., personal and impersonal). We do not 
find sufficient ground in the literature to draw specific predictions about this, so this will 
remain exploratory. Third, given that ingroup identification has been found to moderate many 
intergroup biases, we will examine whether that is also the case with regard to moral 
judgements. We expect that the effect of target’s group membership on moral judgement is 
likely to be moderated by group identification, so that ingroup bias is likely to be stronger 
among high identifiers than among low identifiers (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we have the more 
exploratory aim to examine whether evaluations of moral actions by members of the 
ingroup/outgroup spill over to evaluations of the morality of the respective group as a whole. 
Here we reported four studies carried out to test these hypotheses.  
 
3.1.  Study 1 
 
3.1.1. Method 
 
Design. The design of this study was 2 (Target’s membership: Ingroup vs Outgroup) 
X 2 (Moral scenarios: Switch vs. Footbridge) with identification as an additional independent 
variable. Moral scenarios varied within-participants and target’s membership varied between-
participants.  
Participants. We ran a priori power analysis with an alpha = .05, power = .80 and 
identifying a small to medium effect size (f = .15) to estimate sample size with GPower 3.1 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The estimated sample size was 90. Therefore, data 
was collected via an online survey of 91 participants (65 males, 26 females; Mage = 29.33, SD 
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= 8.46). They were recruited through prolific.ac, a UK based crowdsourcing platform that 
supports research. The study took an average of 13 minutes to complete and, in exchange of 
their participation in the study, participants were paid £1.25 at the end of survey. 
Procedure and materials. Participants were invited to participate in a study 
designated “Dominant Perception Style and Social Judgments.” Participants who agreed to 
participate accessed the study through a web link, read basic information about the study, and 
provided informed consent (see appendix A for the full wording of the survey). Next, groups 
were formed, so as to enable the manipulation of ingroup vs. outgroup target.  
First, we used a Navon task to form two groups: Detailed and global perceivers. 
Participants were shown fourteen Navon (Navon, 1977) stimuli, which consist of large letters 
constructed from a series of small letters. In this task, participants indicated which letter they 
saw on the screen after seeing each stimulus. Upon completion of this task, all participants 
were categorized as “detailed perceivers” regardless of their performance in the task, but they 
were led to believe that the task has divided participants into global and detailed perceivers. 
Then, participants indicated their identification with their assigned group with four questions 
(Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) asking to what degree they identify as a detailed 
perceiver, if they are glad to be identified as a detailed perceiver, if they feel strong ties with 
global/detailed perceivers, and if they see themselves as a detailed/global perceiver. 
Participants indicated their responses on a 7-point scale, from 1 (not all) to 7 (very much). 
The group identification scale formed by averaging responses on all four items proved 
reliable (α = .88).  
 Then, all participants were asked to make social judgements of targets involved in 
two scenarios: First the switch and then the footbridge scenario.  All participants read two 
scenarios, either both involving ingroup targets or both involving outgroup targets. After 
reading each scenario (for scenarios see Appendix A), participants judged the permissibility 
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of the action on a 7-point scale (from 1 forbidden to 7 permissible—adapted from Cushman et 
al., 2006). These judgements constituted our measure of moral judgements. In the original 
texts, enactors’ names are given; however, in the present study just the initials of the names 
were given in order to avoid providing additional categorical information about the enactor, 
like gender, nationality, or ethnicity. In addition, the original scenarios did not include any 
information about the enactor, which we added to disguise the goals of the study.  
At this point, for exploratory purposes, participants were presented with a list of nine 
positive traits, encompassing competence, morality, and sociability (from Leach, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2007), and asked to indicate to what degree the ingroup and outgroup are 
characterised by each trait. The scales proved reliable both for ingroup perceptions (morality: 
α = .88; sociability: α = .90; and competence: α = .84) and for outgroup perceptions 
(morality: α = .87; sociability: α = .88; and competence: α = .88). Please see Appendix B.1 
for exploratory analysis on whether evaluations of moral actions by members of the 
ingroup/outgroup spill over to evaluations of the morality of the respective group as a whole. 
 
3.1.2. Results 
 
 
Moral Judgements. We broke down this interaction by scenario, to examine whether the 
predicted interaction between target and identification would be limited to one of the 
scenarios. To do this, we used Model 1 of the PROCESS macro created by Hayes (2016) 
entering identification as a continuous factor. Identification was mean-centred and target’s 
group membership was coded as 0 for the outgroup target and 1 for the ingroup target. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of means, standard deviations and correlations for variables in Study  
Note: ** indicates significance at the level 0.01 (2-tailed).  
 
Switch scenario. We tested whether the effect of target’s group membership (X) on 
moral judgements (Y) is moderated by group identification (M). The overall model was 
statistically significant, F(3,87) = 3.52, p = .018, R2=.108. There was a negative and 
significant effect of group identification, b = -.65, t(87) = -2.88, p = .005. The effect of 
target’s group membership was not significant, b = .33, t(87)= .94, p = .352. Finally, the 
model shows that the predicted interaction between group identification and target’s group 
membership was significant for this scenario, b= .83, t(87) = 3.03, p =. 003(see Figure 3.1). 
For low identifiers, there was no significant relationship between moral judgements and 
target’s membership, b = .41, t(87) = 1.57, p = .120, that is, no intergroup bias. Similarly, for 
average identifiers, there was no statistically significant relationship between moral 
judgements and target’s membership, b = -.17, t(87) = -.94, p = .352. However, for high 
identifiers, there was a statistically significant negative association between moral 
judgements and target’s membership, b = -.74, t(87) = -2.85, p = .005. Therefore, the results 
indicate that, when making moral judgements in the switch scenario, high identifiers judged 
the outgroup actors’ action as less permissible than when the same action was performed by 
an ingroup member. Simple slope analysis also revealed that the effect of identification on 
moral judgements was significant for outgroup targets, b = -.65, t(87) = -2.89, p = .005, but 
not for ingroup targets, b = .18, t(87) = 1.15, p = .253. 
Footbridge scenario. Moderation analysis was conducted in the same way as 
described for the switch scenario, now focusing only on judgements for the footbridge 
Measures M SD 1 2 3 
1.Footbridge morality score 
2.Switch morality score 
3.Identification 
3.53 
5.16 
4.62 
1.89 
1.75 
1.38 
___ 
.48** 
-09 
 
___ 
-.07 
 
 
___ 
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scenario. For this scenario the overall model was not statistically significant, F(3,87) = .27, p 
= .848, R2 = .009. There was no statistically significant difference between judging an 
ingroup target or an outgroup target, b= .10, t(87) = .24, p = .808,  level of group 
identification had no effect on judgements, b= -.15, t(87) = -.58, p = .562, and there was no 
statistically significant interaction between group identification and target’s membership, b = 
.03, t(87) = .11, p = .911. Our hypotheses were therefore not supported or this scenario. 
Figure 3.1. Moderation of the effect of target's group membership (X) on moral judgements (Y) by the 
levels of group identification (M) in the switch scenario in Study 1. 
 
3.1.3. Discussion 
 
This study provides some evidence for group biases in moral judgements. 
Specifically, we found that participants judged ingroup targets as more moral than outgroup 
targets, but only when ingroup identification was high and only for one of the scenarios 
investigated, i.e., the switch scenario. We did not find any significant effects of target group 
or identification on moral judgements on the footbridge scenario. This difference between the 
two scenarios can have multiple causes. First, it might be purely due to the fact that all 
participants in this study made their moral judgements first for the switch scenario and then 
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for the footbridge scenarios. It is possible that participants paid more attention to the first 
scenario, or allowed their bias to come through in that first scenario, losing interest in the 
second. This type of order effect is common (Wiegmann & Waldmann, 2013) and it will be 
further examined in the second study. However, note that participants could actually see both 
scenarios at the same time, so there is no guarantee they responded to the switch scenario 
first. Examining this by manipulating moral dilemma between participants will significantly 
contribute towards clarifying this effect. 
A second and more theoretical possibility takes into account the distinction made by 
Greene et al. (2001) between the processes involved in making moral judgements in these 
two scenarios. If we take this perspective into account, one might propose that perhaps biases 
in moral judgements emerge mainly when processing is controlled, or that deontological 
judgements might not be so open to bias as those driven by controlled processes. While we 
are not ready to make such an inference—especially given the ample evidence for automatic 
biases in the extant literature—what our results do seem to suggest is that intergroup biases in 
moral judgements can be shaped by group membership and identification, but they can also 
ignore these factors. Finally, as in prior research, we found that actions in the switch scenario 
are perceived as more moral than actions in the footbridge scenario, irrespective of any other 
factor. 
3.2. Study 2 
 
Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend Study 1 in two ways. First, by varying scenario 
between participants, we aimed to avoid order effects and interference between the judgements 
of the two scenarios. Second, by adding a scenario that is also personal but that is typically 
regarded as permissible (because the patient is saved, rather that sacrificed), we aimed to 
further explore the role of scenario on moral judgements. In addition, unlike Study 1, to take 
into account the possibility that people might find one group label more attractive than the 
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other, we counterbalanced the group labels, by labelling half of the participants as detailed and 
the other half as global perceivers. We again hypothesized that moral judgements would be 
more favorable if the target was an ingroup than an outgroup member (Hypothesis 1), in 
particular for high identifiers (Hypothesis 2). 
 
3.2.1. Method 
 
Design. The design of this study was 2 (Target’s membership: Ingroup vs Outgroup) 
X 3 (Moral scenario: Footbridge vs. Switch vs. Implied consent) between-participants 
factorial with identification as an additional continuous independent variable in the model.  
Participants. A priori power analysis with an alpha = .05, power = .80, and 
identifying a small to medium effect size (calculated from effect size (ηp2 = .07) of the 
significant three-way interaction between target’s membership, identification, and moral 
scenario in Study 1 as f = .27) estimated 263 total sample size. Therefore, data was collected 
via an online survey of 279 participants (170 men, 105 women, 4 preferred not to disclose; 
Mage = 29.89, SD = 10.50). Participants were recruited through prolific.ac, a UK based 
crowdsourcing platform that supports research. The study took an average of 8.90 (SD = 
8.25) minutes to complete and, in exchange for their participation in the study, participants 
were paid £1.00 at the end of the survey. 
Procedure. Participants were invited to participate in a study designated “Dominant 
Perception Style and Social Judgments”. Participants who had already completed Study 1 
were not able to participate in this study because they were already familiar with the 
procedure. To do so, we blocked prolific ID’s of those who already participated in the first 
study. Participants who agreed to participate accessed the study through a web link provided, 
read basic information about the study, and provided informed consent.  The procedure for 
group formation and ingroup identification were done the same way in the previous study. 
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The identification was again found to be a reliable scale (α = .86). However, new to this study 
we added the Implied Consent scenario (see Appendix C for the scenario and the response 
scale used in this study) developed by Mikhail (2009). In this scenario the agent is causing 
bodily harm, but this results in a positive outcome for the victim. Therefore, although it can 
be described as personal, it tends to be seen as permissible (even obligatory). Thus, in this 
study, we changed the anchors for moral judgements since the act in the implied consent 
scenario might be considered as praiseworthy. Therefore, all participants were asked to make 
social judgements of actions by targets involved in one of three scenarios, which varied 
according to the experimental condition to which they were assigned, on a 7-point scale, from 
1“Forbidden,” to 4 “Permissible,” to 7 “Praiseworthy.” These judgements constituted our 
measure of moral judgements.  
We measured ingroup and outgroup perceptions the same way we did in Study 1. 
Please see Appendix B.2 for exploratory analysis on group perceptions in Study 2.  
 
3.2.2. Results 
 
To test our predictions, we conducted a 2 (Target’s membership: Ingroup vs 
Outgroup) X 3 (Moral scenario: Switch vs. Footbridge vs. Implied consent) between-
participants ANCOVA with identification as an additional continuous predictor to test our 
predictions. Counterbalanced ingroup identity had no significant main or interaction effects, 
so to simplify the analyses reported here we exclude this factor.  
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Table 3.2. Summary of means, standard deviations and correlations for variables in Study 2. 
Measures M SD 1 2 3 4 
Footbridge morality score 2.85 1.80 __    
Switch morality score 4.95 1.48 N/A __   
Implied consent morality score 6.08 1.26 N/A N/A __  
Identification  4.51 1.30 .17 -.042 .18 __ 
       
 
Most relevant to our hypotheses, the main effect of target’s group membership was 
not statistically significant, F(1,267) = 0.01, p = .918, ηp2 < .001. The interaction between the 
target’s group and identification was also not significant, F(1,267) =  0.08, p = .778, ηp2 < 
.001. Additional results revealed a significant effect of moral scenarios on moral judgements, 
F(2,267) = 12.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, indicating that targets in the implied consent scenario 
were judged as more moral (M = 6.07, SE = .17) than those who in the switch (M = 4.91, SE 
= .15) and in the footbridge scenario (M = 2.81, SE = .16).  There was a significant effect of 
group identification, F(1,267) = 4.63, p = .032, ηp2 = .02 and a significant interaction between 
moral scenario and target’s group membership, F(2,267) = 3.41, p = .035 ηp2 = .03, indicating 
that outgroup targets were judged as more moral ( M = 3.22, SE = .23) than the ingroup 
targets (M = 2.40, SE = .22) only in the footbridge (p < .01) but not in the switch (ingroup 
target: M = 5.01, SE = .22; outgroup target: M = 4.81, SE = .22, p = .512) and the implied 
consent scenarios (ingroup target: M = 6.20, SE = .24; outgroup target: M = 5.93, SE = .24, p 
= .422). There were no other significant main or interaction effects [interaction moral 
scenario X identification, F(2,267) = 1.65, p = .194, ηp2 = .01; three-way interaction, F(2,267) 
= 1.93, p = .147, ηp2 = .01]. 
 
3.2.3. Discussion 
 
This study provided evidence for ougroup bias in moral judgements. Unlike Study 1, 
we did not find group identification to moderate this effect, which contradicts Hypothesis 2. 
Importantly, this time we found this effect only in the footbridge scenario. Although it is 
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unclear why the condition where bias is revealed differs between the two studies, what is 
clear is that both studies show intergroup bias in moral judgements. In addition, our results 
show that these biases can emerge both in the switch (Study 1) and in the footbridge (Study 
2) scenario—and again, judgements of the switch scenario were more positive than 
judgements of the footbridge scenario. While we found an ingroup bias in the switch 
scenario, where the agent’s action was judged to be more permissible (among high 
identifiers), we found outgroup bias in a clearly immoral scenario in Study 2. Indeed, there is 
research showing that people are stricter to in-group members than outgroup members when 
they misbehave (Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 2009). Therefore, this result might be seen as providing 
support for the idea that group biases are designed to protect the moral reputation of the 
ingroup in both cases.  
Besides, if judgements in these scenarios indeed differ in the extent to which they are 
more automatic or more deliberate, this would be consistent with research on other types of 
intergroup biases, which shows intergroup biases both at the more explicit and the more 
implicit levels (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Beach, 2003).  
Why might the two studies differ with regard to the moral dilemma that elicited 
intergroup bias? It is possible that this is a result of the methodological differences between 
these studies. Specifically, Study 1 varied the scenarios within participants, with participants 
being able to see both scenarios at the same time, and Study 2 varied the scenarios between 
participants. This means that judgements in Study 1 were made in a context allowing for 
comparisons or management of biases between scenarios, whereas judgements in Study 2 
were not. To further examine this, we conducted a third study where we replicate the design 
of Study 1, but this time manipulate scenario between (rather than within) participants.  
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3.3. Study 3 
 
In this study, we aimed to replicate Study 1 with a between-participants design where 
participants judged either an ingroup or an outgroup target either in the Switch or the 
Footbridge scenario. We again expected to observe ingroup bias (i.e., more positive 
judgements of the ingroup than of the outgroup target; Hypothesis 1). We again tested 
whether group identification moderated this effect and, despite the results of study 2, given 
past evidence for the role of group identification in group biases, we predicted that the 
intergroup bias would be stronger for high identifiers (Hypothesis 2). Given the results of 
Study 2, which used a between participants design, we further expected an interaction 
between target group, identification, and moral dilemma, so that the bias would be stronger 
for high identifiers and in the Switch rather than the Footbridge scenario (Hypothesis 3).  
 
3.3.1. Method 
 
Design. The design of this study was 2 (Target’s membership: Ingroup vs Outgroup) 
X 2 (Moral scenarios: Switch vs. Footbridge) between-participants with identification as an 
additional continuous independent variable.  
Participants. A priori power analysis with an alpha = .05, power = .80 identifying a 
and identifying a small to medium effect size (calculated from effect size (ηp2 = .07) of the 
significant three-way interaction between target’s membership, identification, and moral 
scenario in Study 1 as f = .27) indicated a total sample size of 107. Therefore, data was 
collected via an online survey of 129 participants (62 males, 67 females; Mage = 35.12, SD = 
12.06). They were recruited through prolific.ac, a UK based crowdsourcing platform that 
supports research. The study took an average of 8.21 (SD = 2.81) minutes to complete and, in 
exchange of their participation in the study, participants were paid £1.00 at the end of survey. 
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Procedure. The procedure for group formation and group identification was done as in the 
previous studies. The group identification scale was found to be reliable (α = .90). The 
procedure was the same as in Study 1 except that scenario variable varied between 
participants, therefore each participant judged either an ingroup or an outgroup target either 
in switch or footbridge scenario. The response scale for moral judgments was the same as in 
the Study 1, from 1 (Forbidden) to 7 (Permissible). Participants who took part in the previous 
studies were unable to participate to this study. Please see Appendix A for full wording of the 
surveys used in Studies 1-4.    
 
3.3.2. Results 
 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a regression analysis entering target group (1 = 
ingroup; 0 = outgroup), moral dilemma (1 = switch; 0 = footbridge ), and group identification 
(continuous, centred) in step 1, the two-way interaction terms in step 2, and the three-way 
interaction term in step 3 (see Table 3.2).   
Table 3.3. Summary of means, standard deviations and correlations for variables in Study 3. 
 
 
 
 
Relevant to hypothesis 1, we did not find overall ingroup favoritism, as the main 
effect of target’s group membership was not significant, b = -.31, t(125) = -1.03, p = .304. 
Hypothesis 2 was also not supported, since the interaction between target’s group 
membership and identification was not significant either, b = -.24, t(121) = -.75, p = .460. 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 also received no support, as the three-way interaction between target’s 
group membership, moral scenario and identification was also not significant, b = -.29, t(121) 
= -.64, p = .525.  
Measures M SD 1 2 3 
1. Footbridge morality score 2.19 1.53 __   
2. Switch morality score 4.71 1.84 N/A __  
3. Identification 4.60 1.37 -.06 -.11 __ 
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  Table 3.4. Regression analysis predicting moral judgements in Study 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
 
There was a main effect of moral dilemma, b = 2.59, t(125) = 8. .52, p < .001, 
indicating that participants judged the switch scenario as more moral than the footbridge, as 
in Studies 1 and 2. No other effects were significant: Main effect of identification, b = -.13, 
t(125) = -1.11, p = .270; two-way interaction between target’s group membership and moral 
scenario, b = -.05, t(121) = -.08, p = .94; interaction between moral scenario and 
identification, b = .14, t(121) = .39, p = .700.  
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Given the effects found in Studies 1 and 2, we chose to continue by probing the 
interaction between target group membership and identification for each scenario. To do so, 
we conducted moderation analysis by using PROCESS macro model 3 (Hayes, 2016), to see 
if the relationship between target’s group membership (X) and moral judgements (Y) was 
moderated by identification level (M) and moral scenario (W).  
Figure 3.2. Moral judgement by target's group membership and group identification: Footbridge and 
Switch scenarios in Study 3. 
The analyses revealed the same effects already reported. Looking at conditional 
effects, only the conditional effect of target’s group membership for high identifiers in the 
switch scenario approached significance, b = -1.01, t(121) = -1.82, p = .07. As displayed in 
Figure 3.2, participants evaluated the outgroup target as more moral than the ingroup target, 
but only in the switch dilemma and when they were highly identified with the group (see 
Figure 2 for patterns in the Footbridge dilemma).  
3.3.3. Discussion 
 
 In sum, although we did not find any support for our specific hypotheses, the results 
suggest an outgroup bias in moral judgements that is moderated by ingroup identification and 
specific to the switch scenario. Unfortunately, the results are not sufficiently strong to allow 
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us to draw clear conclusions. We decided to conduct one more study to once again test these 
effects, as well as to compare moral judgements made in isolation, to those made across 
multiple moral dilemmas. 
 
3.4. Study 4 
 
In the research reported in this chapter we used within-participants’ manipulations, as 
well as between-participants’ manipulations of moral dilemmas. The results are inconsistent 
and those that appear to converge are not strong. The aim of Study 4 is to once again test 
these effects, but also to examine whether moral judgements made when different behaviors 
are compared (as those made with the within participants design of Study 1) reveal stronger 
biases in the Switch dilemma than when only one behavior is being judged at the time (as 
with the between participants design employed in Study 3). This could be the case because 
there is evidence in support of the idea that biases are more likely to be expressed when 
actions are less extreme (and the behavior in the Footbridge scenario is clearly more frowned 
upon) and providing a comparison between more and less extreme behavior might facilitate 
the expression of bias. 
To keep the design manageable, this time we only examine judgements of outgroup 
targets, so we cannot test ingroup bias, as such, but only the extent to which the 
manipulations affect judgements of outgroup targets. As in studies 1 and 3, we expected 
moral judgements of outgroup targets to be affected by group identification, with evaluations 
of outgroup targets becoming less positive as group identification increased (Hypothesis 1). 
Given the results of Studies 1 and 3, we expected to find this effect to be stronger in the 
Switch scenario than in the Footbridge scenario (Hypothesis 2), and stronger in the Switch 
scenario when it was judged at the same time as the Footbridge scenario than when it was 
judged in isolation (Hypothesis 3). 
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3.4.1. Method 
 
Design. The study compares moral judgements when participants judged an action 
either only in the footbridge dilemma, or in the switch dilemma, to when participants judged 
actions both in the footbridge and the switch dilemmas. Therefore, we had three different 
groups: Switch only vs. Footbridge only vs. both. Again, moral judgements constituted our 
dependent variable. Identification was again entered as a continuous variable.  
Participants. A priori power analysis to estimate sample size with GPower 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with an alpha = .05, power = .95, and identifying a 
medium to large effect size (f = .27) indicated a total sample size of 175. Therefore, data was 
collected via an online survey of 198 participants; however, 15 participants were excluded 
due to absent moral judgement scores. Therefore, our analyses include 183 participants (85 
males, 97 females, 1 prefer not to disclose; Mage = 33.11, SD = 21.92). They were recruited 
through prolific.ac, a UK based crowdsourcing platform that supports research. The study 
took an average of 8.17 minutes (SD = 3.28) to complete and, in exchange of their 
participation in the study, participants were paid £1.00 at the end of survey. 
Procedure and materials. Participants were invited to participate in a study designated 
“Dominant Perception Style and Social Judgments.” Participants who agreed to participate 
accessed the study through a web link provided, read basic information about the study, and 
provided informed consent except those who had already taken part in previous studies. Next, 
minimal groups were formed, so as to enable the manipulation of ingroup vs. outgroup target. 
Minimal groups were formed in the same way as in the prior studies. Group identification 
was also measured in the same way as before (α = .88).  
Unique to this study, participants were presented with either only the footbridge 
dilemma, or only the switch dilemma, or both the footbridge and the switch dilemmas 
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(participants were able to see both scenarios at the same time as in Study 1), depending on 
condition. Please see Appendix A for the full wording of the survey used in Studies 1-4.  
 
3.4.2. Results 
 
To test whether identification affected moral judgements, we started by examining the 
correlation between identification and moral judgements in the different scenarios. As 
displayed in Table 3.5, identification was not significantly associated with moral judgements 
in either scenario. Next, we aimed to explore the differences between judgments made singly 
or in combination and whether the link between identification and moral judgements 
depended on the comparative context in which these were made (i.e., whether scenarios were 
presented individually or in combination). 
Table 3.5. Summary of means, standard deviations and correlations for variables in Study 4. 
Measures M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1.Footbridge morality score
a
  2.46 1.48 __     
2.Footbridge morality score
b
  2.26 1.58 N/A __    
3.Switch morality score
a
  5.31 1.48 N/A N/A __   
4.Switch morality score
b
  4.48 1.88 N/A .36** N/A __  
5.Identification  4.56 1.25 .06 .06 .012 -.02 __ 
        
Note: * indicates significance at the level 0.05, **indicates significance at the level 0.01 (2-tailed). 
 
To test this, we first created two new variables comparing moral judgements in 
different contexts. The first variable (MJf) compares moral judgements in the footbridge and 
the switch where they were judged singly vs. moral judgement in the footbridge where it was 
judged in the context of the switch. The other (designated as MJs) compares moral 
judgements in the footbridge and the switch where they were judged singly vs. moral 
judgement in the switch where it was judged in the context of the footbridge.   
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To test whether the direct effect of identification (X) on moral judgements (Y) was 
moderated by the context (M), we ran moderation analyses by using the PROCESS macro 
model 1 (Hayes, 2016; see Figure 3). This was done twice, once focusing on the footbridge 
comparisons (MJf) as the outcome variable and one focusing on the switch comparisons 
(MJs) as the outcome variable. Also, our moderator was dummy coded since it had three 
levels (see Table 3.3). Our baseline group for dummy coding was the one where participants 
judged both scenarios (mixed). Thus, D1 contrasts judgements in mixed (0) with judgements 
in the footbridge (1) scenario. D2 contrasts judgements in the mixed (0) with judgements in 
the switch (1) scenario. Additionally, we computed two new variables to represent the 
interaction between identification and the second dummy variable and entered the 
corresponding dummy and the interactions in the analyses as covariates.  
Table 3.6. Dummy coding for the context (M) variable in Study 4. 
 D1 D2 
Footbridge single 1 0 
Switch single 0 1 
Mixed 0 0 
   
 
Moral judgements in the footbridge (MJf) as the outcome.  The first analyses 
focused on moral judgements in footbridge as the outcome variable (D1: footbridge vs. 
mixed), with D2 and identification X D2 as covariates. This analysis revealed a significant 
Context 
(M) 
Identification 
(X) 
Moral 
judgement 
(Y) 
Figure 3.3. The moderation effect of evaluative context (M) on the relationship between ingroup 
identification (X) and moral judgement of an outgroup target (Y) in Study 4. 
56 
 
 
moderation model, F(5,177) = 30.70, p < .001, R2=.46. The direct effect of identification was 
not statistically significant, b = .07, t(177) = .65, p = .51. Also, the direct effect of D1 
(footbridge vs. footbridge in mixed) was not statistically significant, b = .21, t(177) = .75, p = 
.45 indicating that judgements of the target in the footbridge scenario were unaffected by 
whether these were made in isolation or in combination with judgements in the switch 
scenario. The interaction between identification and D1 was also not significant, b = -.01, 
t(177) = -.05, p = .96, indicating identification did not affect moral judgements in the 
footbridge scenario more when these were made in isolation or together with the switch 
scenario. However, the direct effect of D2 (switch vs. mixed) on moral judgements was 
positive and significant, b = 3.33, t(177) = 3.03, p = .003, indicating that moral judgements in 
the switch scenario when it is judged singly, were more positive than moral judgements in the 
footbridge in the mixed condition. The interaction between identification and D2 was not 
statistically significant, b = -.06, t(177) = -.26, p = .79.  
 Next, we entered D2 (switch vs. mixed) into the analysis as our moderator, and D1 
and id*D1 as covariates. The rest was the same as above. The overall moderation model was 
statistically significant, F(5,177) = 30.70, p < .001, R2=.46. The direct effect of identification 
on moral judgement was not statistically significant, b = .06, t(177) = .48, p = .63. The direct 
effect of D2 on moral judgement was positive and significant, b = 3.05, t(177) = 11.06, p < 
.001, indicating that moral judgements in the switch when it was judged singly were more 
positive higher than moral judgments in the footbridge when it was in the mixed condition. 
The interaction between identification and D2 was not statistically significant, b = -.06, 
t(177) = -.26, p = .79. The statistics for D1 and the interaction between identification and D1 
was the same as when D1 was the moderator (see above).  
In sum, these analyses indicate that participants provided higher morality ratings of 
the target in the switch scenario than of the target in the footbridge scenario, when the latter 
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was judged together with the switch. This was unaffected by identification. Importantly, 
judgements in the footbridge scenario were no different when made singly or in combination 
with judgements in the switch scenario. 
Moral judgements in the switch (MJs) as the outcome. We ran the same analyses 
with moral judgements in the switch as the outcome variable (D1: footbridge vs. mixed), with 
D2 and identification X D2 as covariates. The overall model was statistically significant, 
F(5,177) = 19.68, p < .001, R2=.36. The direct effect of identification on moral judgement 
was not significant, b = .007, t(177) = .06, p = .95. The direct effect of D1 (footbridge vs. 
mixed) was negative and significant, b = -2.01, t(177) = -6.78, p < .001, indicating that the 
agent in the footbridge was judged to be less moral (when it was judged singly) than the 
agent in the switch (when it was judged after the footbridge). The interaction between 
identification and D1 was not statistically significant, b = .09, t(177) = .39, p = .70. The direct 
effect of D2 (switch vs. mixed) was also not significant, b = .66, t(177) = .56, p = .58. 
Finally, the interaction between identification and D2 was not significant, b = .04, t(177) = 
.15, p = .88.  
Next, we entered D2 (switch vs. mixed) in to analyses as our moderator, and D1 and 
identification X D1 as covariates. The overall model was statistically significant, F(5,177) = 
19.68, p < .001, R2=.36. The direct effect of identification on moral judgement was not 
statistically significant, b = -.01, t(177) = -.08, p = .94. The direct effect of D2 on moral 
judgement was positive and statistically significant, b = .83, t(177) = 2.82, p = .005, 
indicating that the agent in the switch scenario was judged to be statically more moral when it 
was judged singly than when the agent in the switch was judged after the footbridge (mixed 
condition). Nevertheless, the interaction between identification and D2 was not statistically 
significant, b = .04, t(177) = .15, p = .88. The statistics for D1 and the interaction between 
identification and D1 was the same as when D1 was the moderator (see above). 
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In sum, evaluations of moral actions in the switch scenario were affected by whether 
it was presented singly or in combination with the footbridge scenario, with the actor being 
judged as more moral when the switch scenario was evaluated on its own than when it was 
evaluated in combination with the footbridge scenario. Again, the target in the switch 
scenario was always evaluated as more moral than the actor in the footbridge scenario, 
irrespective of whether the switch scenario was presented on its own or in combination with 
the footbridge scenario. Group identification played no role in these evaluations. 
 
3.4.3. Discussion 
 
The aims of this study were twofold: To again test the link between group 
identification and moral judgements and to examine whether moral evaluations on the two 
dilemmas would be affected by making single versus repeated judgements. In contrast to our 
prior results, we did not find any significant effect involving group identification in this 
study.  
As in the prior studies and extant research, we found that moral judgements in the 
switch scenario were more positive than in the footbridge scenario. Most importantly for this 
study, we found that this was the case irrespective of whether the switch scenario was 
presented on its own or with the footbridge scenario. In addition, moral judgements in the 
footbridge scenario were unaffected by whether it was presented on its own or together with 
the switch scenario. By contrast, moral judgements in the switch scenario were more positive 
when it was presented on its own than when it was presented with the footbridge scenario. 
This is not what we expected, based on a comparison of the findings of Studies 1 and 3, but 
that comparison was imperfect, as it relied on effects of identification. 
While the absence of effects of identification means that these results do not clarify 
the patterns of our earlier studies, they are interesting in their own right. Specifically, they 
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add to the evidence of the prior studies by directly showing that moral judgements are context 
dependent—not only do they vary depending on the action, but also depending on whether 
more than one action is being judged. Exactly why this happens we cannot say with certainty, 
but future research might wish to focus on understanding this in more detail. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The research reported in this chapter aimed to examine ingroup biases in moral 
judgements in experimentally created groups. We specifically aimed to investigate whether 
moral judgments would be influenced by group membership where there is no prior 
information, beliefs, or emotions associated with the target group. As moral psychology 
literature suggested (Greene et al., 2001), we varied the type of action being judged, to 
investigate whether biases were more likely to emerge for actions that are typically 
considered more or less permissible. Finally, we also examined whether group identification 
moderated these effects. We expected that participants would judge the ingroup target as 
more moral than the outgroup target and this would be the case particularly for high 
identifiers.  
In Study 1, we varied moral scenario variable within participants: each participant 
read two versions of trolley dilemma (switch and footbridge) where the target was either an 
ingroup or an outgroup target. We found that there is an ingroup bias in switch scenario 
(more permissible) particularly for high identifiers. However, there was no bias in footbridge 
scenario. The results indicated that ingroup biases on moral judgments would emerge even in 
minimal group contexts. This also suggested that the type of action being judged and the 
group identification moderated the group biases in moral judgments.  
In Study 2, we aimed to examine whether these findings could be replicated. 
However, moral scenario was varied between participants in order to avoid interference 
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between the moral judgments of two scenarios. In this study, we also added another moral 
scenario that is rated as heroic to further investigate the effect of moral scenario on moral 
judgements. To allow participants indicate their moral responses we ranged the response 
scale from forbidden to permissible to praiseworthy. The results did not replicate those of 
Study 1. However, they again revealed group biases in moral judgments. Specifically, we 
found outgroup bias in the footbridge scenario where the agent shoves a man off the 
footbridge to save five other people.  
We conducted another study to clarify the inconsistency between Studies 1 and 2. 
This study also followed a between participants design as in Study 2, with the same two 
trolley dilemmas as in Study 1. The response scale was the same as Study 1. The results did 
not support our hypothesis. However, there was outgroup bias in the switch scenario only for 
high identifiers when we further analysed the interaction between target group membership 
and identification for each scenario. This direction was opposite to what we found in prior 
studies.  
We conducted a final study to examine whether this inconsistencies across the three 
studies could be explained by methodological differences. In Study 4, we manipulated the 
context where moral judgments were made, specifically varying whether participants made 
isolated judgments of one target in one scenario, or of multiple targets in multiple scenarios 
(i.e., within versus between participants). We did not find effect of identification in this 
study. However, the results indicated that context had an influence on moral judgments. 
Specifically, we found that the switch scenario was judged more positively when it was 
presented on its own than when it was presented with the footbridge scenario. However, there 
was no effect of context on moral judgments in the footbridge scenario across conditions. 
Therefore, this study suggested that moral judgments are context dependent. That is not only 
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do they vary depending on the action, but also depending on whether more than one action 
being judged.  
In sum, identification moderated ingroup bias in Study 1, but did not emerge as a 
significant moderator in Studies 2 and 3. Again, Study 4 did not reveal any main effect or 
moderation of identification. We thus provide very little evidence for the role of identification 
in moral biases, in experimentally created groups.  
Even though we found mixed and somewhat inconclusive evidence for group biases 
in moral judgments, these studies suggest that group membership has a substantial effect on 
moral judgments even in minimal group settings where there is no prior beliefs, thoughts or 
emotions regarding the target group.  
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4 Moral Bias as a Function of Sexist Ideology 
Studies on moral decision-making have suggested that people’s moral judgements of 
a particular action might be affected by various factors, e.g. characteristics of the action itself, 
the decision maker’s group, political ideology, and religious views (Ellemers, von der Toorn, 
Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 2019; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Uhlmann, 
Pizarro, & Ditto, 2009; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). More importantly, the identity of the 
agent and the victim of the action has been shown to have a substantial impact on moral 
judgements (Genezy, 2005; Mealy, Stephan & Urrutia, 2007; Mifune, Hashimoto & 
Yamagishi, 2010; Valdesolo, & DeSteno, 2007; Steinel & de Dreu, 2004). In this sense, the 
moral principles applied by the decision-maker are to some extent flexible and depend on the 
context of the action being judged.  
If moral judgements are flexible, it becomes possible to conceive that they might also 
be biased. When biases shape moral judgements these, in turn, can form the basis of 
discriminatory treatment, such as unequal penalties (Albonetti, 1997; Cameron, Payne, & 
Knobe, 2010; Steffenameier, Painter-Davis, & Ulmer, 2017). These biases can also emerge 
when the action in question is a criminal act (Barkan, & Cohn, 1994; Blair, Judd, & 
Cheapleau, 2004; Daly & Tonry, 1997; Tonry & Melewski, 2008). Undoubtedly, one expects 
that every individual should be treated equally in the justice system, regardless of their 
demographic characteristics. However, there is evidence showing that discrimination can 
influence criminal sentencing. For instance, a study by Blair, Judd, and Cheapleau (2004) 
focused on whether feature-based stereotyping might play a role in criminal sentencing 
decisions of Black and White defendants. The results showed that across both Black and 
White race categories, those with more Afrocentric facial features faced harsher sentences 
than those with less Afrocentric features. One might think that the White-Black polarization 
is a particularly problematic issue in the US, but this is not accurate. For example, recently 
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Labour MP David Lammy (2017) pointed to the pervasiveness of racial discrimination 
against Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (‘BAME’) people in the British criminal justice 
system, highlighting how important it is to examine the relationship between prejudice and 
moral judgements in other national contexts too. Indeed, a recent project on racial bias, led by 
The Guardian (Booth, Mohdin & Levett, 2019), has shown that racial bias towards BAME 
people is also a widespread issue in Britain. To illustrate the issue, findings from the project 
indicated that BAME respondents (47%) were almost two times more likely to be treated like 
a shoplifter in a shop when they hadn’t done anything wrong compared to white respondents 
(22%).   
The relationship between prejudice and moral judgements is not limited to race. There has 
been evidence from research on gender and criminology suggesting that offender’s gender 
plays a role on sentencing decisions (Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Koons-Witt, 2002; Tillyer, 
Hartley, & Ward, 2015; Steffensmier & Demuth, 2006; Steffensmier, Kramer, & Streifel, 
1993). Indeed, research has also suggested that sexism is linked to moral judgements. 
Research examining the relationship between sexism and moral judgements has mostly 
focused on judgements of victims (Masser, Lee, & McKimmie, 2010) and perpetrators (Viki, 
Abrams, & Masser, 2004) of sexual abuse, and on attitudes toward women engaged in 
premarital sex (Sakalli-Ugurlu & Glick, 2003). The general finding is that sexist beliefs are 
associated with harsher treatment of victims and more lenient treatment of perpetrators in the 
context of sexual crimes.  
The existing research suggests that it is particularly associated with moral judgments 
of women. Therefore, we are particularly interested in whether benevolent sexist beliefs 
moderate target gender effects on moral judgements. Benevolent sexism is rooted in ideas 
about the complementarity of men and women, with men being afforded power and 
competence, and women idealized as demure, domestic, and moral (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 
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1997, 2011; Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997; Glick et al., 2000; Jackman, 1999; 
Krys et al., 2018; Leach, Carraro, Garcia, & Kang, 2015; Shields, 2007). It is therefore a form 
of sexism that inherently involves both the expectation that women are moral (descriptive 
stereotype) and the imperative that they should be so (prescriptive stereotype).  
Existing evidence for the link between benevolent sexism and moral judgements is, 
however, quite mixed. In one study, Herzog and Oreg (2008) showed that endorsement of 
benevolent sexism was linked to more lenient punishment of a female offender. This was, 
however, only the case when the female offender behaved consistently with gender roles—
when the offender was a woman who behaved non-traditionally, benevolent sexism did not 
play a role in the suggested punishment of the offender (while hostile sexism predicted 
harsher punishment). A different study, however, found that benevolent sexism was 
negatively related to evaluations of a woman whose behaviour could be seen as violating 
traditional gender roles (whereas hostile sexism was not; Viki, Massey, & Masser, 2005). In 
sum, though research appears to support the idea that sexism moderates moral judgements of 
female targets, results are somewhat inconsistent and in need of further exploration.  
Research in this area has tended to focus on how sexism might affect judgements of 
behaviours such as sexual abuse, or behaviour that violates traditional gender roles. These 
behaviours have direct bearings on the power relations between men and women (reflecting it 
and reinforcing it) and therefore also on the gender hierarchy. Would benevolent sexism have 
similar effects when the target action does not necessarily have such implications? When 
actions have a bearing on the gender hierarchy, the immorality of the action is in itself 
subjective and shaped by sexist beliefs. Since benevolent sexism idealizes women as morally 
pure and superior, any immoral action by a female might be, by definition, considered as 
breaching gender roles.  However, it is as yet unclear whether benevolent sexism shapes 
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moral judgements by making it less hard to detect immorality in women, or by making 
immoral behaviour seem more problematic.  
The first goal of the studies reported here is therefore to clarify the role of benevolent 
sexism in moral judgements by examining whether benevolent sexism also moderates moral 
judgements of women’s actions when these do not have direct bearings on the gender 
hierarchy. The second goal is to shed light on how benevolent sexism might play this role, by 
investigating whether benevolent sexism affects moral judgements by raising the threshold 
for identifying women’s actions as immoral or by leading to harsher judgements of immoral 
actions enacted by women. To examine this, we varied whether moral judgements of actions 
by women were affected by the interplay between benevolent sexism and the moral extremity 
of the action (i.e., how immoral it is). Indeed, one of the ways in which studies with 
inconsistent results for the effects of sexism on moral judgements have differed is precisely 
the moral extremity of the action being judged (from stealing to murder; Herzog & Oreg, 
2008; Viki, Massey, & Masser, 2005). We expected that high endorsement of benevolent 
sexism would be more likely to be associated with a higher threshold for identifying immoral 
behaviour when this behaviour is morally ambiguous, as this allows for sexist beliefs to shape 
whether or not the behaviour is detected as immoral. By contrast, we expected benevolent 
sexism to be associated with harsher moral judgements when the behaviour is clearly 
immoral. In line with this reasoning, we predicted an interaction between benevolent sexism 
and moral extremity so that benevolent sexism would have opposite effects on moral 
judgements of female targets, depending on the moral extremity of the action.  
Overview of the research 
We report three studies. In Study 1, we examine how benevolent sexism affects moral 
judgements of female targets when actions were morally ambiguously vs. clearly immoral. 
Study 2, maintains this design, but adds a manipulation of the gender of the target, to 
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examine whether or not the effect is restricted to female targets. In Study 3, we introduce an 
action that contradicts gender roles, to examine whether the effects of benevolent sexism, 
participant gender, and target gender can be replicated in this context. 
4.1. Pilot Study 
 
The central aim of Studies 1 and 2 is to examine how benevolent sexism affects moral 
judgments of women in contexts where the action does not directly bear on the gender 
hierarchy. That is, Studies 1 and 2 use scenarios that do not reflect the power relationships 
between men and women. In addition, we aimed to vary the moral extremity of the action, so 
we conducted a pilot study to select two hypothetical scenarios that were perceived as 
varying in the extent to which they were seen as moral (ambiguous vs. clearly immoral). We 
also assessed how certain participants were of their moral judgements to explore whether or 
not this was related to morality perception, and how typical the action was of men or women, 
to control for gender stereotypicality. We aimed to select two scenarios that varied in moral 
extremity, but not in gender stereo-typicality.  
We used Prolific academic to recruit 40 participants (15 males, 24 females, 1 
preferred not to say; Mage = 30.60, SD = 10.06, all resident in the UK) for an online survey. 
Participants who agreed to participate accessed the study through a web link provided, read 
basic information about the study, and provided informed consent.  
Next, participants read four scenarios and answered some questions about each 
scenario. There were two pairs of scenarios (see appendix D for the full wording of the 
scenarios). Two scenarios described a target crashing their car because they were driving 
without their glasses (scenario 1; clearly immoral) or because they were in a hurry to help 
someone get to the hospital (scenario 2; morally ambiguous). A second pair described a target 
stealing medication from a pharmacy because they were addicted to drugs (scenario 3; clearly 
immoral) or because they were terminally ill (scenario 4; morally ambiguous). 
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After each scenario, participants indicated the extent to which they thought the action 
was acceptable (from 1 Not at all to 7 Very much), the extent to which they thought that the 
target was moral (from 1 Not at all to 7 Very much), and the extent to which they were sure 
about their judgements (from 1 Not at all to 7 Very much). Finally, participants indicated 
whether they thought that the target in the scenario was more likely to be a man, more likely 
a woman or equally likely to be either (from 1 Strongly disagree to 7 Strongly agree). 
Participants where then thanked for their participation in the study and received £1 as a token 
of appreciation.  
4.1.1. Results and Discussion 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.4, one pair of scenarios differs in the ideal way for our 
purposes: The two scenarios involving the car crash (scenarios 1 and 2) differ in the extent to 
which the action was perceived as moral, but not in the extent to which the actor is expected 
to be more typically male or female (note that the scenarios were perceived as slightly more 
typically female than male). The scenarios do not differ in how certain participants were of 
their judgements. Scenario 2 was judged as clearly immoral (see Table 4.4 and note that SDs 
place all participants’ judgements on the immoral side of the scale) whereas judgements of 
scenario 1 were more ambiguous, as they ranged from slightly immoral to slightly moral, 
around the mid-point of the scale—though all participants were equally certain of their moral 
judgements, the scenarios themselves varied in how stable those moral judgements were 
across participants. Since this is precisely the difference we wanted to create, we chose to 
proceed by using these two scenarios involving the car crash in the subsequent studies. 
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4.2. Study 5 
 
In this study, we examined whether benevolent sexism predicted moral judgements of 
female targets differently depending on whether the action was morally ambiguous or 
immoral. We hypothesised that a female target displaying an ambiguous action (crashing into 
someone when helping another) would be perceived as more moral than a female target 
committing an immoral action (crashing someone because of not wearing their glasses; 
Hypothesis 1). Most importantly, we also anticipated an interaction between moral extremity 
and benevolent sexism, so that higher endorsement of benevolent sexism would be associated 
with judgements of the female target as more moral when the action was morally ambiguous 
(Hypothesis 2a), but with judgments of the female target as less moral when the action was 
clearly immoral (Hypothesis 2b). We included both male and female participants and 
additionally explored whether or not participant gender affected moral judgements. 
 
Note: Means with * differ from the mid-point of the scale (4) and means with different subscripts within 
panels differ with p < .05. 
Table 4.4. Means and standard deviations for the car crash scenarios (left panel) and stealing 
medication scenario (right panel). 
7  ard deviations for the car crash scenarios (left panel) and stealing medication 
sc nario (right p nel) in Pilot Study. 
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4.2.1. Method 
 
Design. The study had a 2 (Moral extremity:  Morally ambiguous vs. Clearly 
immoral) X 2 (Participant’s gender: Female vs. Male) between participants experimental 
design. All targets were female. In addition, participants’ benevolent sexism score was 
measured on a continuous scale, and added to the model as a group-mean centred moderator. 
Hostile sexism1 was measured but not included in the analyses. Our dependent variable was 
moral judgement of the action.  
Participants. A priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul, et al., 2007), based on 
the two-way interaction between moral extremity and benevolent sexism with a small to 
medium effect size f = .15, alpha = .05 and power = .80 suggested a total sample size of 432 
was needed. Therefore, data was collected via an online survey from 438 participants (234 
females, 204 males; Mage = 31.94, SD = 13.23) who were recruited through prolific.ac, a UK 
based crowdsourcing platform. In exchange for their participation in the study, participants 
were paid £1 at the end of the survey. Participants who participated in this study did not 
participate in studies 5 or 7. 
Procedure and materials. Participants were invited to participate in a study 
designated as “Social Judgements and Relationships.” Participants who agreed to participate 
accessed the study through a web link, read basic information about the study, and provided 
informed consent. Next, participants were assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions, where they read a scenario with a female target committing either a morally 
ambiguous action or a clearly immoral action (see Appendix E.1 for full wording of scenarios 
and measures). After reading the hypothetical scenario, they were asked to judge the morality 
of the action, the target’s moral character, and their overall impression of the target. 
Judgement of the action was measured with two items asking to what extent the action was 
                                                   
1 See appendix F.1 for regression analysis with hostile sexism added as a moderator in the model in Study 5. 
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“acceptable” and “moral” on a 7-point scale, from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). 
Evaluations of the target’s character, were assessed by asking participants to indicate to what 
extent they thought that the target was moral, reliable, and trustworthy with three different 
items on a 7-point scale, from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Finally, participants indicated 
their overall impressions of the target on a 7-point scale, from 1 (Very negative) to 7 (Very 
positive). Though these different measures are often examined separately, we chose to 
collapse our three dependent variables into one morality score because they were highly 
correlated (rs ≥ .62, ps ≤ .01), and together constituted a highly reliable morality scale (α = 
.95).   
At this point, participants completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory developed by 
Glick and Fiske (1996). Participants rated to what extent they agree with 22 items in the ASI 
on a 6-point Likert scale, from 0 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The benevolent 
sexism scale was reliable (α = .86) and unaffected by the manipulation of moral extremity, 
F(1,434) = .06, p = .81. However, the effect of participant gender on benevolent sexism was 
significant, F(1,437) = 21.92, p < .001, indicating that male participants (M = 2.01, SD = .06) 
scored higher on benevolent sexism than female participants (M = 1.59, SD = .06) did. The 
interaction between the two did not affect benevolent sexism scores, F(1,437) = 2.48, p = .12. 
Before finishing the study, participants were asked to provide some demographic information 
(age, gender and ethnicity). Finally, they were informed about the actual aims of the research, 
fully debriefed, and paid for their participation in the survey.  
4.2.2. Results 
 
We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which all predictors were entered 
in the first step, their two-way interactions in the second step, and the three-way interaction in 
the third step (see Table 4.5). Moral extremity was coded as 1 = ambiguously immoral, 0 = 
clearly immoral and participant’s gender coded as 1 = female, 0 = male. Benevolent sexism 
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scores were group mean-centred, where we subtracted the mean within the corresponding 
participant gender group from their individual benevolent sexism scores. 
 
Table 4.8. Summary of means, standard deviations and correlations for variables in Study 5. 
 
 
 
Note: * indicates significance at the level 0.05, **indicates significance at the level 0.01 (2-tailed). 
 
In line with Hypothesis 1, the main effect of moral extremity was positive and 
significant, b = 2.13, t(430) = 20.85, p < .001, suggesting targets were judged as more moral 
when the action was morally ambiguous than when it was clearly immoral. The results also 
revealed a significant main effect of benevolent sexism on moral judgment of female targets 
that was positive and significant, b = .13, t(430) = 2.42, p = .016, suggesting more positive 
moral judgements of the female target as benevolent sexism increased. The interaction 
between moral extremity and benevolent sexism on moral judgements was negative and 
significant, b = -.25, t(430) = -2.26, p =.024. Simple slope analysis were computed through 
SPSS. Higher endorsement of benevolent sexism indicates +1SD above the mean and low 
endorsement of benevolent sexism indicates -1SD below the mean. Simple slopes suggest 
that higher endorsement of benevolent sexism was positively associated with judgements of 
female targets as more moral when the action was clearly immoral (contrary to Hypothesis 
2b), b =.26, t(434) =3.35, p < .001, but not when the action was morally ambiguous 
(Hypothesis 2a), b =.01, t(434) = .15, p = .884. While Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted an 
interaction between moral extremity and benevolent sexism, this is not the predicted pattern. 
 Aside from these, we also found a negative and significant interaction between 
participant’s gender and benevolent sexism, b = -.22, t(430) = -2.02, p =.044, with simple 
slope analyses showing that endorsement of benevolent sexism was positively associated 
Measures M SD 1 2 3 
1. Moral Judgement 3.96 1.50 __   
2. Benevolent Sexism  1.78 0.96 .07 __  
3. Hostile Sexism  1.94 1.11 -.48 .40** __ 
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with male participants’ moral judgments, b = .32, t(434) = 2.99, p =.003, but not with female 
participants’ moral judgements, b = -.10, t(434) = -.88, p = .378.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
 
 
Table 4.9. Regression analysis predicting moral judgements in Study 5. 
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Finally, we found a marginally significant three-way interaction between moral 
extremity, participant’s gender, and benevolent sexism, b = .37, t(430) = 1.67, p =.096, which 
revealed that the pattern described above was significant for male participants, but not for 
female participants (see appendix F.3 for details).  
4.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results reveal an interaction between benevolent sexism and moral extremity, but 
with a different pattern from what was expected. Specifically, endorsement of benevolent 
sexism was positively associated with (more lenient) moral judgements of a female target 
who engaged in a clearly immoral action, but there was no association between benevolent 
sexism and moral judgements of the female target when the action was morally ambiguous. 
Though this supports the idea that benevolent sexism also moderates moral judgements in 
scenarios that do not have a direct bearing on the gender hierarchy, this pattern was surprising 
and requires further examination.  
The results must be understood by reference to the finding that, though the moral 
judgements of the ambiguous scenario were around the mid-point of the scale in the pilot 
study, they were actually clearly above the mid-point of the scale in Study 1. That is, the 
ambiguous scenario was not really ambiguous, but moral. In turn, the clearly immoral 
scenario was perceived as immoral, but the extent to which this was the case depended on 
participants’ benevolent sexism. Participants high in benevolent sexism perceived the female 
target as more moral than did participants low in benevolent sexism, but only when the action 
was immoral. Seen in this way, the results make sense and question our ability to distinguish 
ambiguous from clearly immoral scenarios when moral judgements are so subjective. In 
addition, these results raise the possibility that our pilot study with 40 participants did not 
provide sufficient precision to estimate ambiguity defined as ratings around mid-point of the 
scale.   
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 Given the need to replicate these results, we conducted a second study, in which we 
additionally manipulated the gender of the target. Since benevolent sexism aims to regulate 
women’s behaviour, we expect that these effects of benevolent sexism are likely to only 
emerge for female targets.  
 
4.3. Study 6 
 
In this study, we aimed to examine whether or not the results of Study 1 can be 
replicated, especially given the unexpected interaction pattern. We also aimed to extend our 
focus to examine whether the interplay between benevolent sexism and moral extremity was 
restricted to female targets. Given that benevolent sexism aims to regulate women’s 
behaviour, we expected this to be the case. That is we hypothesised that the interaction 
between benevolent sexism and moral extremity would emerge for female targets, but not for 
male targets (Hypothesis 3).  
4.3.1. Method 
 
Design. The study had a 2 (Moral extremity: Ambiguously immoral vs. Clearly 
immoral) X 2 (Participant’s gender: Female vs. Male) X 2 (Target’s gender: Female vs. 
Male) between participants quasi-experimental design. Participants’ benevolent sexism score 
was measured on a continuous scale, and added to the model as a group-mean centred 
moderator. Our dependent variable was moral judgement of the action by female and male 
targets.  
Participants. A priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul, et al., 2007), with a 
small to medium effect size f = .15, alpha = .05 and power = .80 based on the hypothesised 
three-way interaction between benevolent sexism, moral extremity and target’s gender, 
suggested a total sample size of 830. Therefore, data was collected via an online survey from 
827 participants (455 females, 372 males; Mage = 35.15 SD =15.88) who were recruited 
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through prolific.ac, a UK based crowdsourcing platform. In exchange of their participation in 
the study, participants were paid £1 at the end of the survey.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were invited to participate in a study 
designated as “Social Judgements and Relationships.” Participants who already participated 
in the previous study were not allowed to participate again. Participants who agreed to 
participate accessed the study through a web link provided, read basic information about the 
study, and provided informed consent. Next, participants were assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions, where they read a scenario with either a female or a male target 
committing either a morally ambiguous or a clearly immoral action (see Appendix E for 
materials). After reading the hypothetical scenario, participants judged the action, the target’s 
moral character, and provided their overall impression of the target. Judgement of the action 
was measured with two items asking to what extent the action was acceptable and moral on a 
7-point scale, from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Participants also indicated to what extent 
they thought that the target was moral, reliable, and trustworthy with three different items on 
a 7-point scale, from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Finally, participants indicated their 
overall impressions of the target on a 7-point scale, from 1 (Very negative) to 7 (Very 
positive). As in Study 1, these items were highly inter-correlated (rs ≥ .68, ps ≤ .01), and 
together constituted a reliable scale (α = .95) so they were averaged for further analyses.  
At this point, participants completed the 22 items of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996, using 6-point Likert-type scales, from 0 (Strongly disagree) to 5 
(Strongly agree). The benevolent sexism (α = .87) scale was reliable and remained unaffected 
by the manipulations of moral extremity, F(1,819) = .09, p = .77, and of target gender, 
F(1,819) = .001, p =.97, or the interaction between two, F(1,819) =2.480, p =.12. The main 
effect of participant gender on benevolent sexism score was significant, F(1,819) = 43.13, 
p<.001, indicating that male participants (M = 2.12, SD = .05) scored higher on benevolent 
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sexism scale than female participants (M =1.68, SD = .05) did. The interaction between 
participant gender and target gender on benevolent sexism was not significant, F(1,819) = 
1.59, p =.21, the interaction between participant gender and moral extremity was not 
significant, F(1,819) = .98, p = .32. The three-way interaction between three was not 
significant, F(1,819) =.02, p = .88.   Before finishing the study, participants were asked to 
provide some demographic information (age, gender, and ethnicity). Finally, they were 
informed about the actual aims of the present research, fully debriefed, and paid for their 
participation to the survey.  
4.3.2. Results 
 
We conducted a regression analysis (see Table 4.6) in which all predictors were 
entered in the first step, and their interactions in the second step. Moral extremity was coded 
as 1 = morally ambiguous, 0 = clearly immoral, target’s gender was coded as 1 = female, 0 = 
male, and participant’s gender was coded as 1 = female, 0 = male. Benevolent sexism scores 
were group mean-centred. (see Appendix F.2 for analysis with HS)  
 
Table 4.10. Summary of means, standard deviations and correlations for variables in Study 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * indicates significance at the level 0.05, **indicates significance at the level 0.01 (2-tailed). 
 
Measures M SD 1 2 3 
1. Moral Judgement 3.92 1.57 __   
2. Benevolent Sexism  1.87 0.97 .09* __  
3. Hostile Sexism  1.98 1.12 .06 .50** __ 
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Table 4.11. Regression analysis predicting moral judgments in Study 6. 
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Note: A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
 
The results revealed a significant positive association between benevolent sexism and 
moral judgements, b =.14, t(811) = 3.49, p =.001, indicating that higher benevolent sexism 
was associated with judgements of the target as more moral. Contrary to Hypothesis 2 (and 
Study 5), the interaction between moral extremity and benevolent sexism on moral 
judgements was not significant, b = -.02, t(811) = -0.31, p = .760. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, 
the interaction between target’s gender, moral extremity, and benevolent sexism was not 
significant, b =.14, t(811) =.59, p =.557. However, the results revealed an unexpected 
significant three-way interaction between moral extremity, benevolent sexism, and 
participants’ gender, b =.47, t(811) = 2.94, p = .003. This reflects the finding that the two-
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way interaction between benevolent sexism and moral extremity is significant for male 
participants, but not for female participants.  
 This was revealed by two separate moderation analysis testing whether moral 
extremity (X) predicted moral judgements (Y) moderated by benevolent sexism (M) 
separately for male and female participants. We used Model 1 in the PROCESS macro 
created by Hayes (2016) entering benevolent sexism as a centred continuous variable. The 
overall model was significant for male participants, F(3,368) = 144.95, p < .001, R2= .54. The 
main effect of benevolent sexism was positive and significant, b = .21, t(368) = 2.74, p = 
.006. The main effect of moral extremity was also positive and significant, b = 2.26, t(368) = 
20.67, p < .001. Additionally, the two-way interaction between moral extremity and 
benevolent sexism was negative and significant, b = -.29, t(368) = -2.40, p = .017, qualifying 
the effect of benevolent sexism, but not the main effect of moral extremity. That is, the 
interaction shows that all participants perceived the clearly immoral scenario as less moral 
than the morally ambiguous scenario—and, as in Study 5, in reality the morally ambiguous 
scenario was in fact fairly consensually perceived as moral; whereas the clearly immoral 
scenario was perceived as immoral, though to different degrees depending on participants’ 
benevolent sexism. Specifically, for the clearly immoral scenario, moral judgements of the 
target were positively associated with benevolent sexism, b = .21, t(368) = 2.74, p = .006, 
whereas this relationship was not significant in the ambiguously moral scenario, b = -.08, 
t(368) = -.85, p = .396 (see Figure 4.5). These findings, replicate the results of Study 1, 
among male participants and again suggest that we failed to create a morally ambiguous 
condition, having instead created a clearly moral and a clearly immoral condition, the latter of 
which was more harshly judged by participants low in benevolent sexism.  
 For female participants, the overall model was also significant, F(3,451) = 204.71, p 
<.001, R2  = .58, but the only significant effect was that of moral extremity, b = 2.42, t(451) = 
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24.44, p < .001, suggesting that the clearly immoral action was rated as less moral by female 
participants than the morally ambiguous action. The main effect of benevolent sexism, b = 
.09, t(451) = 1.21, p = .228, and the two-way interaction between moral extremity and 
benevolent sexism, b = .17, t(451) = 1.65, p = .099, were not significant (see Figure 4.5).   
 
4.3.3. Discussion 
 
Study 6 replicated some findings from Study 5. Specifically, we replicated the 
interaction between benevolent sexism, moral extremity and participant gender already 
shown (though not significant) in Study 5. This enhances the idea that benevolent sexism 
plays a role in moral judgements, even when the context has no bearing on the gender 
hierarchy. However, the pattern found was again unexpected (though the same as in Study 1), 
in that moral judgements were only affected by benevolent sexism—and positively so—when 
the action was clearly immoral. These results were only revealed for male participants—an 
effect that was already suggested in Study 5. That is, we again found that the higher the 
benevolent sexism, the more male participants perceived the target as moral when the action 
was clearly immoral.  
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Figure 4.4. Moderating effect of benevolent sexism on moral judgements at the levels of moral 
extremity for female and male participants in Study 6. 
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Surprisingly, we did not find support for the effect of target’s gender on this 
interaction between benevolent sexism and moral extremity (Hypothesis 4). We had 
originally expected that the interplay between benevolent sexism and moral extremity would 
be likely to only emerge for female targets (but not for male targets) because benevolent 
sexism aims to regulate women’s behaviour. Therefore, in this study, we are unable to 
conclude that benevolent sexism regulates women’s behaviours but not men’s. That it, our 
results suggest that endorsement of benevolent sexism might lead to overall leniency towards 
people who engage in clearly immoral acts, regardless of their gender.  
In sum, the previous two studies showed that when the action has no direct bearing on 
the gender hierarchy, moral judgements—especially men’s—were moderated by benevolent 
sexism. This is an important addition to the literature, where effects of sexism on moral 
judgements have focused on highly gendered actions. However, our findings did not reveal a 
moderation by target gender, suggesting that the role of benevolent sexism on moral 
judgments that are not highly gendered is not target gender specific. That is, our findings 
suggest that when the action is in itself not highly gendered, benevolent sexism does not seem 
to differentiate between male and female targets. This is odd, if one thinks of the functions of 
sexism as rooted in the differentiation between men and women, but it is possible that what 
we are capturing here is the benevolence aspect of benevolent sexism, rather than sexism per 
se. 
It remains possible, however, that target gender is an important factor when the action 
is gendered. To test this, we conducted a final study.  
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4.4. Study 7 
 
This study aims to test the moderating effect of sexism on moral judgements when the 
action being judged is highly gendered. To do this, we chose an action that is counter-
stereotypical for women—prioritising work over child care—which is expected to elicit 
harsher moral judgements when it is enacted by female targets and judged by perceivers high 
in sexism (Hypothesis 4). That is, in this case, target gender should play a crucial role, as the 
action is only likely to be considered immoral (as a function of sexism) for female targets, not 
for male targets. This principle might of course apply to men performing in a feminine 
domain. However, for this study, we focused only on judgments of women. Therefore, this 
study examines whether sexism moderates the relationship between target gender and moral 
judgments when the action being performed is counter-stereotypical for women.  
While in the prior studies we expected benevolent sexism to be the relevant 
moderator, given its idealization of women as moral, when it comes to gendered actions we 
considered that hostile sexism might play a more important role. This is because hostile 
sexism functions so as to sanction women who deviate from gendered expectations (Glick, 
Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). Therefore, this time we will test whether women who 
choose to prioritise work over child care are considered particularly immoral by individuals 
high in hostile sexism (Hypothesis 4 i.e., interaction between hostile sexism and target 
gender). We will also explore whether benevolent sexism plays a similar role (i.e., interaction 
between benevolent sexism and target gender). Finally, given the work context used in this 
study, we chose to measure perceived target competence, in addition to target morality, so as 
to assess whether or not prioritising work over children paid off for women in terms of 
competence evaluations. Indeed, women have been shown to have to choose between warmth 
and competence in professional contexts (Crosby, Williams & Biernat, 2004; Cuddy, Fiske & 
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Glick, 2004; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002), so it is very possible that this is also reflected 
in a trade-off between morality and sociability. 
4.4.1. Method 
 
Design. The study had a 2 (Target’s gender: female vs. male) X 2 (Participant’s 
gender: Female vs. Male) between participants quasi-experimental design. Participants’ 
benevolent and hostile sexism scores were continuously measured, centred, and added to the 
model as moderators. Our core dependent variable was again moral judgements, but this time 
we also added competence judgements.  
Participants. A priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul, et al., 2007), based on 
the two-way interaction between sexism and target gender, with a small to medium effect size 
f = .15, alpha = .05 and power = .80 suggested that a total sample size of 430 was required. 
Therefore, data was collected via an online survey from 432 participants (244 females, 188 
males; Mage =32.28, SD=12.26) who were recruited through prolific.ac, a UK based 
crowdsourcing platform that supports research. In exchange of their participation in the study, 
participants were paid £1 at the end of the survey.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were invited to participate in a study 
designated as “Social Judgements and Relationships.” Participants who had participated in 
studies 1 and 2 did not participate in this one. Participants who agreed to participate accessed 
the study through a web link provided, read basic information about the study, and provided 
informed consent. Next, male and female participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
two experimental conditions, where they read a scenario with either a female or a male target. 
We changed target’s name and pronouns to indicate the target’s gender. The scenario was 
read as follows: 
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Mary [John], who is a mother [father] of two children, has been a full-time employee 
in the finance department of an energy company, where she [he] has been working for 
five years. Mary [John] has recently been promoted to a management role, which 
resulted in a very hectic schedule for her [him]. Therefore, she [he] is not able to 
spare as much time for her [his] family as she [he] used to. For instance, she [he] 
missed her [his] kid’s school play last week since she [he] had to travel to another 
city for an important meeting with new business clients on the same day.  
 
 After reading the hypothetical scenario, they were asked to judge the action, target’s 
moral character, and their overall impression of the target separately. Judgement of the action 
was measured with two items asking to what extent the action was acceptable and moral on a 
7-point scale, from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Participants also indicated to what extent 
they thought that the target was moral, reliable, and trustworthy with three different items on 
a 7-point scale, from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Finally, participants indicated their 
overall impressions of the target on a 7-point scale, from 1 (Very negative) to 7 (Very 
positive). As in the previous studies, we collapsed our dependent variables into one morality 
score as they were highly correlated (rs ≥ .50, ps ≤.01), and together formed a reliable scale 
(α= .79). In addition, participants rated to what extent the target seemed competent on a 7-
point scale, from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much).  
To measure participants’ benevolent and hostile sexism scores, participants completed 
the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory. Both benevolent sexism (α= .86) and hostile sexism (α= 
.90) formed reliable sub-scales and were unaffected by the manipulation of target gender, 
F(1,428) = .03, p = .86, F(1,428) = .50, p = .48 respectively. However, the effect of 
participant gender on benevolent sexism and hostile sexism was significant, F(1,428) = 
13.25, p <.001, F(1,428) = 13.25, p <.001, indicating that male participants scored higher on 
benevolent sexism (M  = 2.20, SD = .07) than female participants (M  = 1.87, SD = .06), also 
the males were higher on hostile sexism score (M = 2.47, SD = .07) than female participants 
(M = 1.66, SD = .06). The interaction between target gender and participant gender did not 
affect benevolent sexism and hostile sexism scales, F(1,428) = .000, p = .99, F(1,428) = .22, 
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p = .64, respectively. Before finishing the study, participants were asked to provide some 
demographic information (age, gender and ethnicity). New to this study, given the work-
related nature of the scenario, we also asked participants their employment, relationship and 
parental status to control for their effect on moral judgements. Finally, they were informed 
about the actual aims of the present research, fully debriefed, and were paid for their 
participation to the survey.  
4.4.2. Results 
 
Moral judgements. We started by conducting a regression analysis (see Table 4.8) in 
which all predictors were entered in the first step and their interactions in the second step. 
This time, this was done with hostile sexism as the moderator first and then, for exploratory 
purposes, repeated with benevolent sexism as a moderator in the model. We also ran the same 
analyses for competence ratings. Target’s gender was coded as 1 = female, 0 = male and 
participant’s gender was coded as 1 = female, 0 = male. Benevolent and hostile sexism scores 
were group mean-centred as in previous studies. 
Table 4.12. Summary of means, standard deviations and correlations for variables in Study 7. 
Note: * indicates significance at the level 0.05, **indicates significance at the level 0.01 (2-tailed). 
 
Contrary to Hypothesis 4, the interaction between hostile sexism and target’s gender 
on moral judgements was not significant, b = -.05, t(419) = -0.49, p = .622.  However, 
unexpectedly, the three-way interaction between hostile sexism, target’s gender, and 
participant’s gender was negative and significant, b = -.51, t(419) = -2.62, p = .009, so we 
decomposed this effect by participant gender.  To do so, we ran a moderation analysis testing 
whether the effect of target’s gender (X) on moral judgements (Y) was moderated by hostile 
Measures M SD 1 2 3 4 
1.Moral Judgement 5.17 0.97 __    
2.Competence Judgement 5.69 1.05 .62** __   
3.Benevolent Sexism  2.01 0.94 -.08 -.06 __  
4.Hostile Sexism  2.02 1.04 -.12* -.16** .42** __ 
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sexism (M) for male and female participants separately. The results revealed that the 
predicted two-way interaction between target gender and hostile sexism was significant for 
female participants only.  
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
Table 4.13. Regression analysis predicting moral judgements when hostile sexism is a moderator in 
the model in Study 7. 
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 Specifically, for female participants, the overall model was marginally significant, 
F(8,235) = 2.12, p = .053, R2 = .06, and only the two-way interaction between target’s gender 
and hostile sexism was significant, b = -.28, t(235) = -2.35, p = .040 (main effect of hostile 
sexism, b =.05, t(235) = .55, p = .580, main effect of target’s gender, b = .04, t(235) = .34, p 
= .732). This indicates that endorsement of hostile sexism was negatively associated with 
moral judgements of female targets as less moral, b= -.22, t(235) = -2.45, p = .015. However, 
hostile sexism was not associated with moral judgements of male targets, b =.05, t(235) = 
.55, p = .579 (see Figure 4.6).  
For male participants, the overall model was significant, F(8,179) = 2.05, p =.043, R2 
= .08, and only the effect of hostile sexism on moral judgements was marginally significant, 
b = -.19, t(179) = -1.90, p =.058 (main effect of target’s gender, b = -.08, t(179) = -0.58, p = 
.565; two-way interaction between target’s gender and hostile sexism, b =.22, t(179) = 1.58, p 
= .115).  
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Figure 4.5. Moderating effect of hostile sexism on moral judgements at the levels of target gender 
for female participants. 
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We then considered the contribution of benevolent sexism to these relationships. We 
therefore conducted the same regression analysis (see Table 4.9) on moral judgment but this 
time benevolent sexism (group mean-centred) was entered as the moderator instead of hostile 
sexism. There were no significant main or interaction effects on moral judgements when 
benevolent sexism was a moderator in the model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
Table 4.14. Regression analysis predicting moral judgments when benevolent sexism is a moderator 
in the model in Study 7. 
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Competence Judgements. As indicated, given that the scenario focused on a work context 
we chose to also explore competence judgements. We repeated the analyses for competence 
ratings, first with hostile sexism as moderator and then benevolent sexism as the moderator. 
We started with a regression analysis (see Table 4.10) on competence judgment in which all 
predictors were entered in the first step, and their interactions in the second step. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
Table 4.15. Regression analysis predicting competence judgments when hostile sexism is a moderator 
in the model in Study 7. 
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The three-way interaction between target’s gender and hostile sexism and participant 
gender on competence ratings was negative and significant, b = -.63, t(419) = -2.98, p = .003. 
We decomposed this three way interaction by participant gender.  
For male participants, the overall model was not significant, F(8,179) = 1.88, p = 
.217, R2 = .06. There was a significant main effect of hostile sexism, b = -.25, t(179)= -2.20, p 
= .030, and a marginally significant interaction between target’s gender and hostile sexism, b 
= .28, t(179) = 1.74, p = .084. This revealed that the endorsement of hostile sexism was not 
associated with competence judgements of female targets who prioritised work over child 
care, b = .03, t(179) = .24, p = .814. Surprisingly, a male target who prioritised work over 
child care was perceived as less competent as hostile sexism increased, b = -.25, t(179)= -
2.20, p = .030 (see Figure 4.7). The main effect of target’s gender was not significant, b =.23, 
t(179) = 1.44, p = .151.  
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Figure 4.6. Moderating effect of hostile sexism on competence judgements at the levels of 
target gender for female and male participants in Study 7. 
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 For female participants, the overall moderation model was significant, F(8,235) 
=2.50, p =.013, R2 = .08 and only the two-way interaction between target’s gender and hostile 
sexism was significant, b = -.32, t(235) = -2.32, p = .021. This revealed that the endorsement 
of hostile sexism was negatively associated with competence judgement of female targets as 
less competent, b = -.33, t(235) = -3.55, p < .001, whereas it did not have an effect on 
competence judgements of male targets, b = -.01, t(235) = -.10, p = .918 (see Figure 4.7). The 
main effect of hostile sexism was not significant, b =-.01, t(235) = -.10, p = .918. The main 
effect of target’s gender was not significant, b = .07, t(235) = .53, p = .595.  
We then replaced hostile sexism with benevolent sexism in the same moderation 
model (see Table 4.11).  
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Note: A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
 
The interaction between target gender and benevolent sexism was negative and 
significant, b = -.27, t(419) =-2.43, p = .016.  Simple slope analysis revealed that the 
endorsement of benevolent sexism was negatively associated with competence judgements of 
female targets, b = -.19, t(419) =-2.50, p = .013, but not associated with competence 
Table 4.16. Regression analysis predicting competence judgments when benevolent sexism is the 
moderator in the model in Study 7. 
93 
 
 
judgements of male targets, b = .09, t(419) =1.15, p = .251. The three-way interaction 
between target’s gender, participant’s gender and benevolent sexism was marginally 
significant, b = -.43, t(419) =-1.94, p = .053. For male participants, the overall model was not 
significant, F(8,179) = .74, p =.660, R2 = .03. The main and interaction effects were not 
significant (main effect of benevolent sexism, b = .03, t(188) = .26, p = .795; main effect of 
target gender, b = .24, t(188) = 1.47, p = .143; two-way interaction between benevolent 
sexism and target gender,  b=-.04, t(188) = -.23, p = .816).   
For female participants, the overall model was marginally significant, F(8,235) = 2.49 
p =.013, R2 = .08. The two-way interaction between target’s gender and benevolent sexism 
was significant, b = -.43, t(235) = -3.11, p = .002, indicating that endorsement of benevolent 
sexism was negatively associated with competence judgements of female target as less 
competent, b = -.33, t(235) = -3.38, p<.001, whereas it was not associated with competence 
judgements of male targets, b = .10, t(235) = 1.03, p = .306 (see Figure 4.8). 
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Figure 4.7. Moderating effect of benevolent sexism on competence judgements at the levels of 
target gender for female participants in Study 7. 
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4.4.3. Discussion 
 
The aim of this final study was to examine whether target’s gender would moderate 
the effect of sexism on moral judgements when actions are highly gendered. In this study, 
male and female targets engaged in the same behaviour, which was counter-stereotypical for 
women but not for men—i.e., favouring work over child care. We found the predicted 
interaction between target gender and hostile sexism, but only among female participants, not 
among male participants. In this study, benevolent sexism did not have a moderating effect. 
As for our exploratory analysis regarding competence ratings, the effects differed for 
male and female participants. Male participants high in hostile sexism derogated the male 
target who favoured work over child care, whereas, female participants derogated the female 
target who displayed the same behaviour.  This suggests that each gender group made harsher 
competence judgements of ingroup members who favoured their work but neglected their 
child. It might be that when explicitly asked, those who scored high on hostile sexism were 
concerned about being perceived as sexist about their judgments of female targets. Namely, 
male participants with high hostile sexism might have over-corrected their judgements in 
such a manner that they would not appear as sexist (overcorrection effect). Indeed, a study by 
Park, Smith, and Correll (2010) showed that although implicit associations of moms as 
caretakers and of dads as breadwinners were prominent, participants were cautious about 
their explicit judgments of female targets. Moreover, for female perceivers, both hostile and 
benevolent sexism have significant effect on competence judgments of female target whereas 
sexism does not affect competence judgements when the target is a male. This supports the 
idea that benevolent and hostile sexism aim to regulate women’s behaviour to keep them 
within traditional gender roles.  
In sum, this study suggests that when a woman performs a counter-stereotypical 
action for women, moral judgments are affected by hostile sexism in particular. However, 
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both benevolent and hostile sexism affect competence judgments of women when they 
violate the gender expectations (i.e., prioritizing work over child care).  
4.5. Conclusion 
 
The literature has shown that sexist attitudes towards women have an impact on how 
women are evaluated—specifically when women violate the traditional female role (Herzog 
& Oreg, 2008; Masser, Lee, & McKimmie, 2010; Viki, Abrams, & Masser, 2004; Viki, 
Massey, & Masser, 2005; Sakalli-Ugurlu & Glick, 2003). However, it was to date unclear 
whether sexism also moderated moral judgements when actions did not directly bear on the 
power relationship between men and women. Therefore, this research aimed to answer 
whether moral judgements were moderated by sexism when the actions were less gendered 
than in prior research. 
The studies we conducted provided the support for the notion that moral judgements 
are affected by sexist attitudes towards women even though additional gendered information 
was not provided. However, the patterns found, though some were consistent across studies, 
were not in line with our hypotheses and therefore require particularly cautious consideration.  
In studies 5 and 6 we created one scenario that was perceived as moral and one that 
was perceived as immoral. The extent to which the target in the immoral scenario was 
perceived as immoral was shaped by benevolent sexism, particularly for male participants. 
That is, for male participants, the higher their benevolent sexism, the more they perceived the 
female (Study 5) and both the male and the female (Study 6) targets as moral. This is not 
what we expected, so why might this be? Our argument was that benevolent sexism would 
shape moral judgements when actions were sufficiently ambiguous to allow room for sexist 
beliefs to play a role. We expected this would be the case in the scenario that we labelled 
ambiguous, as a result of the ratings obtained in the pilot study. However, in the main studies, 
with a much larger sample size, this scenario was not perceived as ambiguous at all—all 
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participants rated this scenario as moral. The fact that we did not find any role for sexist 
beliefs in this scenario, thus, is perhaps not surprising.  
The clearly immoral scenario, in turn, was expected to leave less room for 
interpretation, and therefore also less room for effects of sexism. This scenario was indeed 
perceived as immoral, as planned, but we nevertheless found effects of sexism on moral 
judgements—high benevolent sexism led participants (especially male participants) to 
perceive targets as more moral when the action was clearly immoral. This would suggest that 
the role of benevolent sexism is restricted to immoral actions, driving more lenient 
judgements. However, the fact that target gender did not moderate this effect (Study 6) 
suggests that this is not as much an effect of sexism as an effect of benevolence. The fact that 
participant gender did moderate this effect does however raise further questions about how to 
interpret this finding 
In Study 7 we explored whether sexism moderated moral judgements when the 
actions were clearly gendered. Whereas studies 5 and 6 focused on the ‘positive’ effects of 
benevolent sexism, as improving evaluations of (women’s) immoral actions, Study 7 focused 
on how hostile sexism can make these evaluations more negative. We found that, for female 
participants, endorsement of hostile sexism was associated with harsher moral judgements of 
female targets who favoured work over child care, whereas they did not affect judgements of 
men who engaged in the same behaviour. Competence judgements were differently affected, 
with men suffering greater cost to their competence evaluations when they favoured work 
over child care, when they were evaluated by male participants high in hostile sexism. 
Benevolent sexism, in turn, was negatively associated with moral judgements of women who 
favoured work over child care as less competent only for female participants.  
Overall, the present research contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it 
suggests that the role of benevolent sexism can be triggered even in settings that do not bear 
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on the gender hierarchy (Study 5 and 6). Second, the present studies indicate that the 
interplay between benevolent sexism and the extent to which an action is clearly (im)moral 
occurs in different patterns for male and female perceivers. While endorsement of benevolent 
sexism was associated with more lenient moral judgements from male participants in clearly 
immoral scenario, it predicted more lenient judgements of targets from female participants in 
ambiguously immoral scenarios. Finally, the present research, in line with existing research, 
suggests that benevolent sexism suggest a more positive moral judgements of females (and 
males) whereas hostile sexism functions in a more negative way to judge women who 
deviates from traditional roles.  
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5 General Discussion 
The present research aimed to investigate moral biases in minimal groups and as a 
function of ideologies. Previous research in moral psychology indicates that moral judgments 
are not controlled, consistent, objective and indiscriminative, but are substantially influenced 
by intuition, personal preferences and affective responses (Haidt, 2001). This suggests that 
moral decision making is open to intergroup biases, which often contribute to intuitive 
judgements. Indeed, the evidence suggests that even though people perceive their moral 
judgements as objective and unbiased they in fact make biased moral decisions that are then 
rationalized as objective (e.g., Haidt, Rosenberg, & Horn, 2003; Uhlmann et al., 2009).  
In this thesis, I identify important gaps in this literature and report research with 
which I aimed to address some of these gaps. Previous research on intergroup biases mostly 
focused on judgements of individuals and groups on warmth and competence, but scholars 
have highlighted that it is crucial to examine moral judgements as a third fundamental 
dimension. (Leach et al., 2007). Here, we do precisely that, and examine the effect of 
intergroup biases on judgments of others’ morality. Prior research that has looked at the 
effects of intergroup factors on moral judgements has mainly included pre-existing groups 
(e.g., race, ethnicity, gender) that are associated with certain beliefs and emotions, making it 
hard to determine whether observers’ judgments of the group’s morality arise from observers’ 
knowledge of group stereotypes, or from ideological biases held by observers. Separating 
these issues is one of the central aims of the work presented in this thesis. I specifically aimed 
to investigate whether or not moral judgments are influenced by group membership where 
there is no prior information, beliefs, or emotions associated with the target group (i.e., in a 
minimal group setting). As in much prior research on intergroup biases (Branscombe, Wann, 
Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1997; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Sidanus, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994), I also examined 
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whether or not group identification moderated the effect of group membership on moral 
judgement (Chapter 3). Next, I aimed to build in group-related ideologies. To do so, I focused 
on gender categories and examined whether sexism moderated moral judgements of women’s 
actions, since sexism towards women primarily aims to regulate women’s behaviour (Chapter 
4).  
Although there is already some research that is relevant to the understanding of the 
link between sexism and moral judgements—such as research examining the penalties 
recommended for women who have committed certain crimes (e.g., Viki, Massey, & Masser, 
2005)—this research does not directly measure moral judgements. In addition, existing 
research in this area tends to focus on actions that are highly gendered and have a specific 
bearing on the power relation between men and women, such as women’s deviation from 
gender role prescriptions (Herzog & Oreg, 2008; Sakalli-Ugurlu & Glick, 2003; Masser, Lee, 
& McKimmie, 2010; Viki, Massey, & Masser, 2005). Therefore, when examining the role of 
sexism in moral judgements, I aimed to examine whether it would play a similar role when 
the action to be judged does not directly bear on the power relationship between men and 
women (e.g., careless driving). Finally, I chose to focus specifically on the possible 
moderating effect of benevolent sexism, since it is a form of sexism that directly refers to 
women’s morality. Specifically, benevolent sexism idealizes women as morally pure and 
superior to men (Glick & Fiske, 1995). As such, for people who endorse benevolent sexism, 
an immoral action displayed by a woman would be both unexpected (due to the descriptive 
aspect of gender stereotypes) and particularly problematic (due to the prescriptive aspect of 
gender stereotypes; Rudman & Glick, 2010).  
My goal in this thesis was therefore to examine whether moral judgments would be 
influenced by biases based on group membership and associated ideologies. I examined this 
both with experimentally created (Chapter 3) and pre-existing social groups (Chapter 4).  
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5.1. Summary of Findings 
 
5.1.1. Moral Biases in Minimal Groups 
 
In Chapter 3, I reported four studies looking at the effect of (minimal) group 
membership on moral judgments. These studies aimed to provide evidence that group biases 
in moral judgements emerge even in minimal group conditions.  Therefore, the studies in this 
chapter involved experimentally created groups. I additionally varied the type of action being 
judged, to examine whether biases were more likely to emerge for actions that are typically—
i.e., in the absence of group biases—considered more or less permissible. Finally, we 
examined whether group identification moderated these effects. I expected that participants 
would judge the in-group agent as more moral than the out-group agent and that this would 
be the case in particular for high identifiers.  
In Study 1, each participant read two versions of the trolley dilemmas, where the 
moral agent was either an ingroup or an outgroup member. The dilemmas varied in the extent 
to which they are typically judged as permissible, with the switch scenario (where the agent 
causes the death of one person to save others by switching the track on which an uncontrolled 
train rides) being typically judged as more morally permissible than the footbridge scenario 
(where a similar result is obtained by pushing a person from a footbridge onto the train track). 
After reading each dilemma, participants indicated their moral judgement of the agent. The 
results revealed an ingroup bias in the switch scenario when group identification was high, 
but no bias in the footbridge dilemma. This suggested that ingroup biases on moral 
judgements do emerge in these minimal contexts, that they can be moderated by the type of 
action being judged, and that group identification plays an important role in this process.  
In Study 2, we aimed to examine whether these findings could be replicated and this 
time manipulated moral dilemma between participants, so as to avoid strategic decisions 
participants could make about when biases could be better expressed. Additionally, we aimed 
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to examine whether similar biases would emerge when the action is actually praiseworthy or 
heroic. Therefore, we added another version of the trolley dilemma where the agent causes a 
death of someone while trying to save another one. The findings of this study did not 
replicate the findings of Study 1. The results did reveal group biases in moral judgements, but 
the pattern was different this time. Specifically, this time the results showed an outgroup bias 
in the footbridge scenario that is seen as clearly wrong. This suggest that biases are designed 
to protect the moral reputation of the ingroup. However, no group bias emerged in the other 
scenarios.  
The first two studies have already identified two different ways in which intergroup 
biases might affect moral judgments: judging ingroup more favourable in ambiguous 
situations (amongst high identifiers), and judging ingroup more harshly when their actions 
are clearly wrong. Therefore, we conducted a third study to check whether strategic concerns 
played a role in moral judgments. This third study also followed a between-participants 
design (as Study 2), with the same two trolley dilemmas as in Study 1. The response scale, 
which had been adjusted in Study 2 to allow participants to praise the agent’s action, was 
again the same as in Study 1. The agent’s group membership was varied between 
participants. This time, the results revealed an outgroup bias in the switch scenario and no 
moderation of group identification. So, again, we found evidence in favour of the idea that 
group biases can emerge under minimal conditions, but the precise pattern of results was 
again different and therefore inconclusive. 
We opted to conduct a final study to examine whether this inconsistency across the 
three studies could be explained by methodological differences between studies. In Study 4, 
we manipulated the context where moral judgements were made, specifically varying 
whether participants made isolated judgements of one dilemma/agent at the time, or of 
multiple dilemmas/agents at the same time (i.e., within versus between participants). The 
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results indicated that moral judgments in the switch scenario were affected by whether it was 
presented in an isolated or of with the footbridge scenario (i.e., the switch scenario was rated 
more positively when it was presented on its own than when it was presented with the 
footbridge scenario). However, there was no effect of identification revealed in this study. 
Although these results did not clarify the patterns of earlier studies, they contributed the 
literature by directly showing that moral judgments are context dependent—not only do they 
vary depending on the action, but also depending on whether more than one action being 
judged. 
In sum, across four experimental studies with minimal groups, we found evidence for 
group biases, but the specific patterns obtained varied greatly. As such, these results are 
inconclusive and must be taken with care. However, they suggest that group membership has 
an influence on moral judgments even in minimal group settings.  
5.1.2. Moral Biases as a Function of Sexist Ideology 
 
It is possible that one of the reasons why the results of my first line of work were 
inconclusive is precisely because they isolated group membership from its deeper meaning 
and associated ideologies. As such, the context provided room for participants to choose to go 
with the flow, or to strategically adjust their responses, as determined by other considerations, 
such as individual differences in the importance of fairness and egalitarianism. Though I did 
not address this, I chose to proceed my enquiries by focusing on pre-existing social groups 
and relevant ideologies. 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I report 3 studies that aimed to investigate whether moral 
judgments are influenced by endorsement of certain ideologies. I focused on judgements of 
women’s morality and on sexist ideologies towards women, specifically on a type of sexism 
that directly refers to women’s morality, i.e., benevolent sexism. Gender context is 
particularly interesting for moral psychology because sexist ideologies refer directly to 
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morality of women (e.g., women are morally pure).  I hypothesized that benevolent sexism 
would predict moral judgements of women’s actions, but given the scarcity of research in this 
area it was unclear whether this would happen because benevolent sexism would make it 
harder to perceive women’s actions as immoral (as women are expected to be moral), or 
because immoral actions enacted by women would be more strongly rejected (as moral 
actions are prescribed for women). To examine this, I opted to vary the moral extremity of 
the action and expected that participants high in benevolent sexism would be less ready to see 
women as immoral when they enact actions that are seen as only slightly immoral (or about 
which people are more divided). By contrast, I expected that participants high in benevolent 
sexism would be particularly harsh towards women who enacted clearly immoral actions.  
These predictions were tested in the studies reported in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The 
results of Study 5 revealed, as predicted, an interaction between moral extremity and 
benevolent sexism, but the pattern was very different from what we expected. Specifically, 
we found that benevolent sexism did not affect moral judgements of women who displayed 
morally ambiguous actions, but led to more lenient judgements of women who displayed 
clearly immoral actions. A marginally significant three way interaction suggested that this 
was particularly the case among male participants. It is possible that men with higher 
benevolent sexism respond to power relations in the case of judging morality of women with 
a show of niceness. Research suggests that the stable high status groups might not need to 
discriminate against a low status group because their position in the social hierarchy is 
already securely prestigious. This secure position might even sometimes lead to outgroup 
bias (noblesse oblige; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013). 
However, it is also worth nothing at this point that the morality ratings made by participants 
in the study differed from those made by pilot participants, in that participants in the main 
study judged the scenario intended to be ambiguous as actually moral. In that sense, the 
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results can be rephrased as showing that benevolent sexism moderates judgements of the 
female target’s morality only when the action was immoral, but not when it was moral, which 
is more in line with our original reasoning.  
Give the unpredicted results, we sought to replicate these findings in an additional 
Study 6. We also opted to add male targets to the female targets examined in Study 5, to 
examine whether the effects of benevolent sexism were specific to cases where participants 
judged women’s moral behaviour, as ambivalent sexism theory would lead us to expect 
(Glick & Fiske, 1995). Indeed, we expected that effects of benevolent sexism would be 
specific to female targets, since benevolent sexism is proposed to be a sexist ideology that 
aims to regulate women’s behaviour. The results again revealed a significant effect of moral 
extremity and a significant interaction between benevolent sexism and moral extremity. The 
patterns replicated those found in Study 5. As before benevolent sexism moderated moral 
judgements when the action was clearly immoral but not when it was (ambiguously) moral 
suggesting that benevolent sexism moderated judgments of immoral, but not of moral actions. 
This time, the three way interaction between benevolent sexism, moral extremity, and 
participant gender was actually significant, revealing that the two-way interaction between 
moral extremity and benevolent sexism was significant only for male participant, not for 
female. Finally, the study did not reveal any effects of target gender, which was also 
unexpected—that is, for male participants judging a clearly immoral action, the higher their 
benevolent sexism the more they judged the target as moral, irrespective of the target’s 
gender. This suggests that perhaps the measure of benevolent sexism, at least in this context, 
taps into a more general benevolence, rather than on to the concept of benevolent sexism per 
se. This is slightly troubling, given all the research and knowledge that has relied on this 
concept and measure, but it needs to be considered. Alternatively, it is possible that 
benevolent sexism towards women overlaps with benevolent sexism towards men (Glick & 
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Fiske, 1999; Glick et al., 2004) and that what we are seeing in these studies is the shared 
influence these concepts might have on moral judgements of male and female targets. 
However, benevolent sexism towards men, as originally conceptualized, does not involve the 
same type of assumed moral superiority in men as benevolent sexism towards women does, 
so this is unlikely to be the case. Research on sexism towards men is, however, very scarce 
and might require further development if we are to understand these patterns more 
completely. 
To close my examination of these issues, I conducted a final study (Study 7, also 
reported in Chapter 4) to examine whether sexism would also moderate moral judgements of 
men and women who enact gendered actions. I was interested in judgements of women in 
particular and whether sexism would determine the extent to which a counter-stereotypical 
action (e.g., prioritising work over child care) would be regarded as immoral, especially as 
compared to when a man displays the very same action (which is then not considered 
counter-stereotypical). In this case, we also focused on the possible effect of hostile sexism, 
given that—though it does not explicitly refer to women’s (im)morality—it expresses 
antagonism towards women who behave in counter-stereotypical ways.  
The results of Study 7 revealed that, for female participants patterns were as expected:  
endorsement of hostile sexism was associated with harsher moral judgements of female 
targets who favoured work over child care. This was not the case when female participants 
evaluated a male target who displayed the exact same behaviour. The judgements made by 
male participants were only affected by hostile sexism (and not the target’s) gender, with 
higher hostile sexism leading to more negative moral judgements of both male and female 
targets. Finally, benevolent sexism had no significant effects on moral judgements in this 
study.  
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In sum, we found that hostile sexism negatively affected the moral judgements of 
women who behaved counter-stereotypically, but not of men who displayed the same 
(stereotypically male) behaviour, but this was only the case for female participants. It is 
however important to note that the effects were small and judgements of male and female 
targets were all above the mid-point of the scale.  
5.3. Key Contributions of the Present Thesis 
 
The present research contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, broadly, 
it supports the idea that biases in moral judgments are influenced by group membership and 
intergroup biases, as well as gender-based ideologies like benevolent and hostile sexism, and 
contextual factors. This adds to prior knowledge on intergroup biases, which tended to focus 
on other domains such as competence, or warmth more generally. My research takes on the 
finding that morality is the most important dimension in the positive evaluations of 
individuals and groups (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013; Cottrell, Neuberg, & 
Li, 2007; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Pagliaro, Ellemers, Barreto, & Di Cesare, 2016; 
van der Lee, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Rutjens, 2017) and reveals that group biases can be 
expected also here. This finding in itself has implications across a variety of areas where 
moral judgements are made, ranging from judgments within criminal justice systems to job 
applications. With regards to the effect of intergroup biases on moral judgments, this research 
evidences intergroup biases in moral judgments even when minimal groups were used, 
allowing us to isolate effects of categorization from ideological or historical factors. Though 
the specific patterns we found in this line of work were inconsistent, we did consistently find 
(in- or out-) group biases in all studies. This suggests that future research will need to delve 
more deeply into when and why these biases emerge, but also that we need to be alert for the 
emergence and use of such biases in contexts where newly formed groups come into contact, 
such as during organizational mergers.  
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  Fitting this research into broader trends in the literature, and following from the 
above, the present research brings together accounts of moral judgements from moral 
psychology and the social psychology of intergroup relations. Indeed, this research supports 
both the idea that group membership and related ideologies affect moral judgements, 
producing intergroup biases in moral judgements, and the idea that the particular action being 
judged plays an important role and can over-rule group biases. Combining these insights from 
different literatures is an important aspect of good science and allows new insights come to 
flourish.   
With regard to the specific ideologies I examined, these findings extend existing 
research by showing that the effect of benevolent sexism can be triggered in settings that do 
not directly bear on the power relations between men and women, such as when judging 
careless driving. It is true that driving is regarded as a stereotypical male skill (Ozkan & 
Lajunen, 2006), and therefore poor driving is a stereotypically female display, but driving is 
not something that men do to women, or that women do to men. This can be contrasted with 
other gendered behaviours such as rape or domestic violence, which directly speak of the 
power men hold over women. The fact that benevolent sexism also affects moral judgements 
in such domain that are not bearing on gender-hierarchy suggests that its effects are more 
widespread. At the same time, we found that benevolent sexism was positively associated 
with the judgements or female and of male targets, which raises questions regarding what this 
concept means, or at least what the measure taps into. Clearly, then, these findings contribute 
to raising questions as to what these measures represent in these settings and to highlight the 
need for more research on the effects of benevolent sexism on judgements of men.  
I also contribute to existing knowledge by showing that sexism (this time hostile 
sexism) determines the moral judgement female participants made of other women. This is 
suggestive of system justification beliefs that are shared by minority and disadvantaged 
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groups (Jost & Kay, 2005; Pratto, Sidanus, & Levin, 2006) and contributes to a growing area 
of research examining the effects of sexism on relationships amongst women (Van Breen, 
Barreto, Darden. & Dimitriou, in preparation). It is unclear, however, why these effects did 
not emerge for male participants, as system justification (and social dominance) beliefs tend 
to operate similarly for majority and minority groups. Future research will need to delve into 
this more deeply to shed further light on these findings. 
5.4. Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 A rather striking limitation of my research is that the findings that emerged from my 
first line of research—on intergroup biases in moral judgments in minimal groups—revealed 
inconsistent patterns across studies (Chapter 3). One possible reason for this inconsistency 
might be the sample sizes were not large enough to generate reliable and replicable results. 
Future research should aim to replicate these studies with better powered designs.  
Another limitation of the studies reported in Chapter 3 is the use of trolley dilemmas. 
Though we used trolley dilemmas to ensure that actions were not gendered, and though 
trolley dilemmas are a useful tool to test research questions regarding morality because they 
are easily modifiable (Greene, 2008; Mikhail, 2011), research using these dilemmas has 
important limitations. For example, trolley dilemmas lack mundane and psychological 
realism and might therefore not elicit the same moral processes as real moral encounters 
(Bauman, McGraw, Bartel, & Warren, 2014). They also involve single item responses, the 
reliability of which cannot be checked. This in itself might explain why the effects were so 
different across studies. Future research using trolley dilemmas might take steps to address 
these concerns increasing its validity.  
 Another limitation of these studies is the use of an online data collection method, 
which restricted our methodological options. Different versions of trolley dilemmas have 
been shown to tap into different moral decision making processes and these can be evidence 
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by examining activity in different brain areas, or by examining response times. 
Unfortunately, by using online surveys, it was not possible to reliably assess participants’ 
response times, which did not allow us to delve more deeply into these different processes. 
Future research might take response times into account when investigating group biases in 
moral decision making, to further validate the difference between processes tapped into by 
the different scenarios and shed further light on the circumstances under which additional 
variables (like group membership or ideology) might affect moral decision making.  
 With regard to the research reported in Chapter 4, a methodological shortcoming is 
that the manipulations were not perceived by participants in the main study in exactly the 
same way as by pilot participants. This might have simply been a result of the small sample 
size used in the pilot study. However, it is also important to consider that, as my studies also 
show, moral judgements are subjective and determined by context, so it is possible that the 
mere presence of group membership cues alters moral judgements by making these less 
ambiguous. This is a possibility that can be further examined by future research.  
 It is possible that the scenarios we used in these studies tapped more directly into 
competence rather than morality. That is, it is possible that provoking an accident was 
perceived as more dumb than immoral. Although it is clear that the scenarios were perceived 
as different in morality, there is evidence indicating that an action can often be construed both 
in competence and morality terms (Wojcizke, 1994). Without teasing these domains apart, 
especially when examining gender biases, we are unlikely to achieve a precise understanding 
of these processes.   
Finally, in the studies reported in Chapter 4 we also saw that benevolent sexism had 
similar effects for male and female targets, which was surprising and raises questions either 
about the validity of the benevolent sexism measure, or about the validity of the benevolent 
sexism concept, or both. Manipulating the gender relevance of the scenario—e.g., one 
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scenario including behaviour that enhances the patriarchy and another not—might well assist 
in shedding further light on this issue. More generally, however, research in this area has not 
paid sufficient attention to how benevolent sexism might affect judgements of men, a 
knowledge which our findings suggest is needed. 
Apart from all these methodological limitations, the present research is an attempts to 
integrate literatures from moral and intergroup psychology. Indeed, combining insights from 
different literature is an important aspect of good science, and is well placed to give new 
insights. However, drawing on different theoretical traditions could bring potential drawbacks 
to the research. In the account of this research, the intersection between moral psychology 
and intergroup psychology could be particularly tricky because both morality and group 
considerations are very basic drivers of human cognition and behaviour, which might make 
investigating group biases in moral judgements difficult. Therefore, the unexpected results in 
the present research should also be considered as the early-stage problems of integrating 
these different literatures that can subsequently lead to novel insights in the future. It is 
important to further explore the intersection between moral psychology and intergroup 
psychology 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
My goal in this thesis was to investigate moral biases in an intergroup context. I have 
done this across seven experimental studies using minimal groups as well as real social 
categories. Even though my findings are inconclusive, they contribute to the existing 
evidence by revealing that group categorizations and ideologies interfere with moral 
judgements, further underlining their flexibility and subjectivity, and uncover various paths 
for the future research.  
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Appendix A: Materials Used in Studies 1-4 with Full Wording  
 
Dominant Perception Style and Social Judgements 
 
This study aims to examine how people’s visual perception styles can affect how they 
perceive social situations. In the first part of the study, you will be asked to perform a brief 
task to establish what your dominant visual perception style is. In the second part, you will 
read two short stories and will be asked to answer some questions about them. Finally, you 
will be asked a few demographic questions. The study will take approximately 20 minutes to 
complete. At the end of the study, you will be awarded £x as a token of appreciation.  
 
In this study, participants will be asked to read some simple scenarios that involve individuals 
making decisions that affect other people’s lives. Reading these scenarios might be upsetting 
to some people. If you think you might find such scenarios upsetting, it is recommended that 
you do not participate in this study. If you do choose to participate and, nevertheless, 
experience some distress, please note the resources we list at the end of the survey, which you 
can access to seek help.    
 
Please also note that your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may 
discontinue your participation at any time without prejudice. You do not have to answer any 
questions that you may rather not answer—however, if you leave questions unanswered we 
will not be able to use your responses, so please do try to answer all questions. Note also that 
all your answers are anonymous and all data collected will be treated confidentially. All data 
will be stored electronically and will only be used for research purposes.  
 
Upon completion of this study, you will be provided with more information regarding the 
aims and expected outcomes of this research. If you have further questions or concerns 
regarding your participation in this study, or if you wish to receive a brief summary of the 
results of this study at a later point in time, please contact Esra Dasci (PhD candidate) at 
ed368@exeter.ac.uk or Prof Barreto at m.barreto@exeter.ac.uk.  
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Ethics Review Board of School of 
Psychology at the University of Exeter. If you are happy with the above information and 
would like to participate in this study, please click "Continue" to start. If you do not wish to 
participate, you can just close your browser. You can also go directly to the last page of this 
study, if you wish to see the list of resources we provide for individuals struggling with their 
psychological wellbeing. 
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Part 1: Dominant perception task 
Research has shown that there are two main styles of visual perception: Global and detailed 
perception. While everyone uses both perception styles, each individual has a tendency to use 
one more than the other.  
 
Individuals who tend to use a global perception style more often are designated as Global 
Perceivers. This means that, when observing an object or situation, they most immediately 
identify its general or global features. Their main focus is the overall image, or situation—
i.e., the ‘whole’. Global perceivers usually process information by starting from general 
elements and proceeding to an analysis of more local details.  
Individuals who tend to use a detailed perception style are designated as Detailed Perceivers. 
This means that, when observing an object or situation, they tend to first direct their attention 
to details and local features. Therefore, their main focus on the specific details–i.e., the 
‘parts’ that make the whole. Detailed perceivers usually process information by starting from 
detailed elements and proceeding to an analysis of the whole.   
 
Next, you will perform a task that can identify which is your dominant perception style. In 
this task, you see either an S or an H (smaller or larger) on the computer screen. Your task is 
to press one of two keyboard buttons to indicate which letter you have seen first on the 
screen. If you see an S first, you should press the key “s”. If you see an H first, you should 
press the key “h”. 
 
When you are ready, please use the mouse to click on the ‘start’ key.  
*** 
(After completion of Navon task, a clock will appear for 15 seconds and says) 
“Your responses are being scored by the computer. You will get to know your dominant 
perception style soon!” 
*** 
Your predominant perception style is: Global/Detailed!  
*** 
Now take a moment to think what it means to you to be a global/detailed perceiver. How do 
you imagine that this affects your daily life—how you perceive the world around you, how 
you think, and how you make decisions, among other things. After you have given this some 
thought, please write below a description of what being a global/detailed perceiver means to 
you. (max 100 words)  
 
*** 
We would now like to ask you to indicate how you feel about being a global/detailed 
perceiver. To do so, please read each of the following questions and provide your answer by 
clicking on the number that corresponds to your response. 
 
Not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very much 
 
1. To what degree do you identify as a global/detailed perceiver? 
2. To what extent are you glad to be a global/detailed perceiver? 
3. To what degree do you feel strong ties with other global/detailed perceivers? 
4. To what degree do you see yourself as a global/detailed perceiver? 
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In the second part of this study we would like to examine how individual’s perception styles 
affect how they perceive social situations. Prior research has shown that these perception 
styles affect a variety of basic cognitive processes, but so far we know very little about how 
they affect perceptions of social situations. To help us examine this, we ask you to read two 
short stories and to answer some questions about them. There are no right or wrong answers 
to these questions—what matters to us is your personal opinion. Please do not think too long 
about your answers—we are interested in your initial opinion.  
 
Scenario 1 (Switch) 
 
D is a 21 year-old university student, who is currently studying History. D, who is 
a global/detailed perceiver, enjoys travelling in their free time. One day, D is a 
passenger on a train whose driver has just shouted that the train’s brakes have 
failed, and subsequently fainted of the shock. On the track ahead are five people; 
the banks are so steep that these five people will not be able to get off the track in 
time. The track has a side track leading off to the right, and D can turn the train 
onto it. Unfortunately there is one person on this right hand track. D can turn the 
train to this right hand track, killing the one; or can refrain from turning the train, 
letting the five die. 
 
To what extent do you think that it is morally permissible for D to switch the train 
to the side track? (Drag the cursor to indicate your answer) 
Forbidden  1  2  3  4  5  6 7         Permissible  
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Scenario 2 (Footbridge) 
 
F is a 25 year-old graduate whose favorite hobbies are reading and doing sports. F, 
who is a global/detailed perceiver, is on a footbridge over the train tracks. F 
knows trains and can see that the one approaching the bridge is out of control. On 
the track under the bridge there are five people; the banks are so steep that they 
will not be able to get off the track in time. F knows that the only way to stop an 
out of control train is to drop a very heavy weight into its path. But the only 
available, sufficiently heavy weight is a large man wearing a backpack, also 
watching the train from the footbridge. F can throw the man with the backpack 
onto the track in the path of the train, killing him; or can refrain from doing this, 
letting the five die. 
 
To what extent do you think that it is morally permissible for F to throw the man 
onto the train track? (Drag the cursor to indicate your response) 
Forbidden  1  2  3  4  5  6 7         Permissible  
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Before providing some demographic information about yourself, please think again about the 
two thinking styles we described at the start of this study. Try to make an image of how the 
people who have one and the other thinking style. Next, you will see several attributes. Please 
indicate to what extent you think that each of these attributes describes Global and Detailed 
perceivers. 
Not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very much 
 
   Global Perceivers  Detailed Perceivers  
1. Competent 
2. Likeable 
3. Friendly 
4. Honest 
5. Intelligent 
6. Sincere 
7. Warm 
8. Skilled 
9. Trustworthy 
 
 
 
 
Demographic information  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. Before we end, please answer a few demographic 
questions.  
 
How old are you? 
 
What is your gender? M/F 
 
Are you a native English speaker? Y/N 
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Thank you for taking part in this study. Here we explain a little more about the goals of this 
study and what we expect to find. It also explains a few important things: Information that we 
gave you that was not entirely truthful. So please read this carefully. 
 
We told you at the start of the study that our goal was to examine how people’s visual 
perception styles can affect how they perceive social situations. In fact, our goal is slightly 
different: We aim to examine whether individuals’ judgements of the moral actions of 
another individual vary depending on whether or not they belong to the same social group.  
 
To examine this, in the first part of the study, participants performed a task and were 
subsequently assigned to one of the two groups: Global and Detailed Perceivers. In reality, 
however, assignment to the groups was unrelated to participants’ performance in the task. 
This was done so that two groups could be experimentally created, that is, so that we could 
create groups about which participants know very little—which is important for an accurate 
test of our hypothesis. Then, you were asked some questions to see to what extent you 
identified with your assigned group. Finally, in the second part, participants judged the 
actions of either an ingroup or an outgroup target in two moral dilemmas. Our hypothesis is 
that people will judge the actions of members of their own group as more moral (or 
permissible) than actions by members of another group.   
 
It is important that you understand that there was a little deceit involved in this study. We 
apologize for that. However, it is also important that you understand that this was done so 
that it is possible to research something which is both new and very important: How group 
membership can affects moral judgements. Thank you for your contribution to this scientific 
endeavor! 
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INFORMATION ON SUPPORT FOR DISTRESS 
 
If you feel like you have been feeling upset and emotionally distressed, the following 
organizations offer advice and support: 
 
 You may find emotional support services near your area through NHS Mental 
Health: 
(http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/stress-anxiety-depression/pages/low-mood-stress-
anxiety.aspx)  
 You may also find useful to contact Mental Health Foundation which offers help 
people in distress and need immediate help in the UK: 
(https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/contact) 
 You can also access the mental health charity, the Samaritans, through this website:  
http://www.samaritans.org/how-we-can-help-you/contact-us 
 Many colleges and most universities have a free and confidential in-house counselling 
service, with professionally qualified counsellors and psychotherapists that you can 
access. You can usually find information about what they offer and how to make an 
appointment in the counselling service section of your university’s website. This free 
service in universities is available to postgraduates as well as undergraduates. 
 If you are from University of Exeter, it has a Mental Health Team which can offer 
free mental health advice and support:  
(http://www.exeter.ac.uk/wellbeing/mental_health/) 
 You could also make an appointment through Wellbeing and have a one-to-one 
meeting with a counsellor. 
(http://www.exeter.ac.uk/wellbeing/contact/makeanappointment/) 
 
If you have further questions or concerns regarding your participation in this study, or if you 
wish to receive a brief summary of the results of this study at a later point in time, please 
contact Prof. Barreto at m.barreto@exeter.ac.uk or Esra Dasci (PhD Candidate) at 
ed368@exeter.ac.uk  
 
If your concerns are related to the ethical aspects of this research, feel free to contact the 
Chair of the Psychology Ethics Committee, Dr Lisa Leaver at l.a.leaver@exeter.ac.uk  
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Appendix B: Exploratory Analysis on Group Perceptions for Studies 1 and 2 (Chapter 
3)  
B1. Study 1: Do Moral Judgements of Targets Affect Evaluations of Their Group as a 
Whole? 
Analytical strategy. We explored whether judging the morality of a target’s actions 
affects the judgement of the morality of the group as a whole (see Figure 2). We already 
know that, for one of the scenarios (switch), moral judgements are themselves affected by the 
group membership of the target and by group identification (see main analyses in Chapter 3, 
Study 1). The relationship between moral judgements and perceived group morality also 
needs to be moderated by the group membership of the target, since we only expect perceived 
group morality to be affected by the moral judgement of a member of that same group. Thus, 
for moral judgements related to the switch scenario (i.e., the scenario for which moral 
judgements were affected by the independent variables), target group membership is expected 
to moderate both the relationship between identification and moral judgements of the target 
and the relationship between moral judgement of the target and group morality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test this, for analyses involving the switch scenario, we used model 58 of the 
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016), testing the indirect effect of identification (X) on perceived 
(in/out)group morality (Y), through moral judgement (M), at different levels of target group 
Target’s 
group 
Moral 
judgement 
Morality 
perception 
Identification 
Figure 8.Model specifying the moderated mediation of the 
effect of group identification (X) on perception of the 
group’s morality (Y), by moral judgements of the target (M), 
at different levels of target group membership (W). 
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membership (W, coded as -1 = ingroup and +1 = ougtroup). This was done twice, once 
focusing on perceived ingroup morality as the outcome variable and once focusing on 
perceived outgroup morality as the outcome variable. 
However, for the footbridge scenario, moral judgements of the target were not 
affected by target group membership, group identification, or their interaction. Therefore, in 
this case, we tested merely whether the relationship between moral judgements of targets in 
the footbridge scenario (X) and perception of group morality (Y) was moderated by the 
target’s group membership (M) by using model 1 of PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016), while 
controlling for identification.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived ingroup morality. First of all, as we already reported above, we conducted 
a moderation analysis to see if the effect of target’s group membership (X) on moral 
judgements (Y) is moderated by group identification (M) in the switch scenario. From this 
analysis, we knew that the effect of target’s group membership on moral judgements was 
depended on levels of group identification (see above).  
New to these analyses, the overall model predicting ingroup morality (Figure 2) was 
also significant, F(4,86) = 7.13, p < .001, R2=.25. The direct effect of moral judgement on 
perception of ingroup morality was not statistically significant, b= .005, t(86)= .09, p = .93. 
Target’s 
group 
Moral 
judgement 
Morality 
perception 
Figure 9. The moderation of the relationship between moral judgements of 
targets in the footbridge scenario (X) and perception of group morality (Y) 
by the target’s group membership (M). 
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The direct effect of identification on perception of ingroup morality was positive and 
significant, b = .26, t(86)= 3.40, p < .01. Also the direct effect of target’s group membership 
was statistically significant and positive, b = .87, t(86)= 2.66, p < .01. Finally, there was a 
significant interaction between moral judgements and target’s group membership on 
perception of ingroup morality, b= -.18, t(86)= -3.02, p < .01, reflecting a positive effect of 
moral judgement of the target on perception of the ingroup as moral when the target is an 
ingroup member (b = .23, t(87) = 2.58, p = .01), but not when it is an outgroup member (b = -
.24, t(87) = -2.84, p = .006). 
The analyses did not reveal a significant moderated mediation, 95% CI [-.05, .24]. 
However, when we probed the mediation at different levels of the target’s group membership, 
we found that the indirect effect of identification on perception of ingroup morality through 
moral judgement was significant for those who judged an outgroup target, b = .11, 95% CI 
[.001, .27], but not (opposite to expectation) for participants who judged an ingroup target, b 
= .03, 95% CI [.-02, .15].  
For the footbridge scenario, we tested merely whether the relationship between moral 
judgements of targets and perceptions of ingroup morality was moderated by target’s group 
membership (see Figure 3), while controlling for identification. The overall model was 
statistically significant, F(4,86) = 5.36, p < .001, R2 = .20. The direct effect of target’s group 
membership was not statistically significant, b = .21, t(86) = .94, p = .35, and neither was the 
effect of moral judgements, b= .06, t(86)= 1.09, p = .27. The interaction between target’s 
group membership and moral judgements was also not statistically significant, b= -.08, t(86)= 
-1.40, p = .16. The only significant effect was the direct effect of identification on perception 
of ingroup morality, which was positive and statistically significant, b= .33, t(86)= 4.33, p < 
.001, indicating that the higher the ingroup identification was the more moral the ingroup was 
perceived as a whole.   
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Perceived outgroup morality. When perception of outgroup morality was the 
ultimate outcome, the overall model was significant, F(4,86) = 3.95, p < .01, R2=.15. Neither 
the direct effect of moral judgement, b= .04, t(86)= .66, p = .51, nor the direct effect of target 
group membership, b= .54, t(86)= 1.57,  p = .12, on perception of outgroup morality was 
statistically significant. However, the interaction between moral judgement and target’s group 
membership was significant, b = -.14, t(86) = -2.25, p = .03, reflecting a positive effect of 
moral judgement of the target on perception of the outgroup as moral when the target is an 
ingroup member (b = .21, t(87) = 2.34, p = .02), but not when it is an outgroup member (b = -
.14, t(87) = -1.64, p = .10). 
With regard to the moderated mediation, the results show that the index of moderated 
mediation was not significant, 95% CI [-.12, .19]. In addition, the indirect effect of 
identification on perception of outgroup morality through moral judgements was neither 
statistically significant for those who judged an ingroup, b = .03, 95% CI [-.03, .13], nor for 
those who judged an outgroup target, b = .07, 95% CI [-.07, .22].  
For the footbridge scenario, again we tested merely whether the relationship between 
moral judgements of targets and perceptions of outgroup morality was moderated by target’s 
group membership, while controlling for identification. The overall model was statistically 
significant, F(4,86) = 2.69, p = .04, R2=.11. As for perceived ingroup morality, there were no 
significant main effects of target’s group membership, b = -.05, t(87)= -.20, p = .84, or moral 
judgements, b = -.02, t(87)= .31, p = .76. There was also no significant interaction between 
target’s group membership and moral judgements, b = -.04, t(87)= -.73, p = .47. The only 
significant effect was the direct effect of identification on perception of outgroup morality, 
which was positive and significant, b = .20, t(86)= 2.57, p = .01, indicating that the higher the 
ingroup identification the more moral the outgroup was perceived.  
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B2. Study 2: Do Moral Judgements of Targets Affect Evaluations of Their Group as a 
Whole? 
Analytical strategy. As in the first study, here we also wanted to test if judging the 
morality of a target’s actions affects the judgement of the morality of the group as a whole. In 
this study we added moral scenario to the model (see Figure 4).  
To test this, we used model 68 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016), testing the 
indirect effect of identification (X) on perceived (in/out)group morality (Y), through moral 
judgement (M), at different levels of target group membership (W, coded as -1 = ingroup and 
+1 = outgroup) in different moral scenarios (Z). This was done separately to predict 
perceived ingroup morality and to predict perceived outgroup morality as the outcome 
variable. Because moral scenario has three levels, it was dummy coded. D1 contrasts 
judgements in the footbridge (0) scenario with judgements in the switch (1) scenarios 
(implied consent = 0). D2 contrasts the footbridge (0) with the implied consent (1) scenarios 
(switch = 0). Additionally, we ran each analysis twice with the relevant dummy as moderator 
(Z), and the other dummy as a covariate.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Target’s 
group 
 (W) 
 
Moral 
scenario 
(Z) 
Moral 
judgement 
(M) 
Identification 
(X) 
In/outgroup 
morality 
(Y) 
Figure 10.Model specifying the moderated mediation of the effect of group identification 
(X) on perception of the group’s morality (Y), by moral judgements of the target (M), at 
different levels of target group membership (W) and moral scenario (Z). 
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Perceived ingroup morality. First of all, as we already reported above, we conducted 
a moderation analysis to see if the effect of target’s group membership on moral judgements 
is moderated by group identification and moral scenario. From this analysis, we obtained a 
statistically significant overall model, that if the effect of identification on moral judgement 
was moderated by target’s group membership and the type of moral scenario (D1: footbridge 
vs. switch), F(8,269) = 24.41, p < .001, R2=.45. The direct effect of identification on moral 
judgement was positive and statistically significant, b = .24, t(269) = 2.53, p = .01, indicating 
that the higher the identification was the more moral the target was judged. The direct effect 
of target’s group membership on moral judgement was not significant, b = .47, t(269) = 1.07, 
p = .28. Further, the interaction between identification and target’s group membership was 
not statistically significant, b = -.07, t(269) = -.75, p = .45. The effect of D1 (footbridge vs. 
switch) on moral judgement was positive and statistically significant, b = 3.12, t(269) = 4.48, 
p < .001, indicating that targets in the switch scenario was judged as more moral than those 
who were in the footbridge. However, the interaction between identification and D1 was not 
statistically significant, b = -.24, t(269) = -1.62, p = .11. The interaction between target’s 
group membership and D1 was negative and marginally significant, b = -1.34, t(269) = -1.94, 
p = .05, indicating that the outgroup targets were judged to be more moral than the ingroup 
targets regarding footbridge vs. switch scenarios. Also, the three-way interaction between 
identification, target’s group membership and D1 was positive and marginally significant, b = 
.25, t(269) = 1.67, p = .09.  
The model for perceived ingroup morality, we obtained an overall significant model, 
F(6,272) = 9.15, p < .001, R2=.17. The direct effect of moral judgement on perceived ingroup 
morality was not significant, b = .01, t(272) = .19, p = .85. However, the direct effect of 
identification on perceived ingroup morality was positive and statistically significant, b = .33, 
t(272) = 6.77, p < .001, indicating that the higher the identification was the more moral the 
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ingroup was perceived as a whole. The direct effect of target’s group membership was not 
statistically significant, b = -.10, t(272) = -.68, p = .50. Finally the interaction between moral 
judgement and target’s group membership on perceived ingroup morality was not statistically 
significant, b = .01, t(272) = .33, p = .74.  
As we already mentioned above, the direct effect of identification on perceived 
ingroup morality was statistically significant. However, there were no conditional indirect 
effects (all 95% CIs included 0) of identification on perceived ingroup morality through 
moral judgement at different levels of target’s group membership and D1, suggesting that the 
effect of identification was not transmitted through moral judgement to perceived ingroup 
morality.  
Next, we entered D2 (footbridge vs. implied consent) in to analysis as our moderator 
and D1 as a covariate. When moral judgement was a DV, the overall model was again 
statistically significant, F(9,269) = 23.29, p < .001, R2=.44. Neither the main effect of 
identification, b = .10, t(269) = 1.18, p = .24, nor the main effect of target’s group 
membership, b = .01, t(269) = .03, p = .98, on moral judgement was statistically significant. 
Also the interaction between identification and target’s group membership was not 
statistically significant, b = .02, t(269) = .29, p = .77. However, the main effect of D2 on 
moral judgement was positive and statistically significant, b = 2.58, t(269) = 3.22, p = .001, 
indicating that targets in the implied consent scenario was judged as more moral than those 
who were in the footbridge. However, two way interactions (identification*D2, b = .13, t(269) 
= .79, p = .43, target’s group membership*D2, b = -.41, t(269) = -.52, p = .61) and the three 
way interaction (identification*target’s group membership*D2, b = .03, t(269) = .19, p = .85) 
were not significant.  
The model for ingroup morality, we also obtained an overall significant model, 
F(6,272) = 8.86, p < .001, R2=.16. However, only the direct effect of identification was 
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positive and statistically significant, b = .32, t(272) = 6.71, p < .001. The main effects of 
moral judgement (b = .03, t(272) = .85, p = .40), target’s group membership (b = -.11, t(272) 
= -.71 , p = .48) and the interaction between moral judgement and target’s group membership 
(b = .01, t(272) = .34 , p = .73) were not significant. The conditional indirect effects of 
identification on perceived ingroup morality was not statistically significant at any levels of 
target’s group membership and moral scenario (footbridge vs. implied consent).    
Perceived outgroup morality. Similarly, we ran moderated mediation analysis twice 
with the relevant dummy as an IV and the other as covariate to test the moderated mediation 
effects on perceived outgroup morality. The results was the same with the first part of 
analysis in perceived ingroup morality (see above). 
The model for outgroup morality, we again obtained an overall significant model, 
F(6,272) = 7.31, p < .001, R2=.14. The direct effect of moral judgement on perceived 
outgroup morality was positive and statistically significant, b = .08, t(272) = 2.37, p = .02, 
indicating that the higher the moral judgement was the more moral the outgroup was 
perceived. Also the direct effect of identification on perceived outgroup morality was positive 
and statistically significant, b = .26, t(272) = 5.21, p < .001, indicating that the higher the 
identification the more moral the outgroup was perceived. However the direct effect of 
target’s group membership on perceived outgroup morality was not statistically significant, b 
= -.002, t(272) = -.01, p = .99. Finally, the interaction between moral judgement and target’s 
group membership was not statistically significant, b = .005, t(272) = .15, p = .88.  
With regard to the moderated mediation analysis, we did not obtain any statistically 
significant indirect effects of identification on perceived outgroup morality through moral 
judgement at the different levels of target’s group membership and moral scenario.  
Next, when we entered D2 (footbridge vs. implied consent) as our IV and the other 
dummy as a covariate. Again the overall model was statistically significant, F(9,269) = 
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23.29, p < .001, R2=.44 when moral judgment was a DV. However, there were no significant 
main or interaction effects on moral judgement (same as results with D2 in perceived ingroup 
morality).  
When we added perceived outgroup morality into model as a DV, the model was 
overall significant, F(6,272) = 7.26, p < .001, R2=.14. The direct effect of moral judgement 
on perceived outgroup morality was positive and statistically significant, b = .11, t(272) = 
3.50, p < .001, indicating that the higher the moral judgement was the more moral the 
outgroup was perceived. Also the direct effect of identification was positive and statistically 
significant, b = .26, t(272) = 5.16, p < .001, indicating that the higher the identification the 
more moral the outgroup was perceived. However the direct effect of target’s group 
membership on perceived outgroup morality was not statistically significant, b = .002, t(272) 
= .01, p = .98. Finally, the interaction between moral judgement and target’s group 
membership was not significant, b = .004, t(272) = .12, p = .91. 
With regard to the moderated mediation analysis, although there was a statistically 
significant and positive direct effect of identification on perceived outgroup morality, there 
were no conditional indirect effects of identification on perceived outgroup morality at any 
levels of target’s group membership and moral scenario (D2: footbridge vs implied consent).  
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Appendix C: Implied Consent Scenario and the response scale used in Study 2 
 
L is 27 years old and likes walking in their leisure time. L, who is a global 
[detailed] perceiver, is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he 
notices that the train that is approaching is out of control. L sees what has 
happened: the driver of the train saw a man walking across the tracks and 
slammed on the brakes, but the brakes failed and the driver fainted. The train 
is now rushing toward the man. It is moving so fast that he will not be able to 
get off the track in time. L is standing next to the man, whom they can throw 
off the track out of the path of the train, thereby preventing it from killing the 
man. The man is frail and standing with his back turned. L can throw the man, 
injuring him; or can refrain from doing this, letting the man die. 
 
To what extent do you think that it is morally permissible for L to throw the 
man? (Drag the cursor to indicate your response)  
Forbidden 1 2 3 4(Permissible) 5 6 7 Praiseworthy 
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Appendix D: Full Wording of the Scenarios and Measures in Pilot Study 
 
Stealing Medication Scenarios 
 
Ambiguously immoral condition: 
M is terminally ill. The doctor has told them that there is one drug that could cure them, but 
this drug is not freely available and is very expensive, so M cannot afford it. M tried to 
borrow money in various ways, but they could not get the cost of the medication together. At 
this point, M decided to break into a pharmacy and steal the medication.   
 
Clearly immoral condition: 
M has a non-life threatening illness and has been using medication to control the illness and 
the associated pain. M has become addicted to some of this medication and cannot afford to 
buy as much as the addiction requires. M tried to borrow money in various ways, but they 
could not get the cost of the medication together. At this point, M decided to break into a 
pharmacy and steal the medication.   
 
 
Provoking an Accident Scenarios  
 
Ambiguously immoral condition: 
When M was passing by, they saw a stranger having a heart attack. M tried to help this 
person and decided to drive them to the hospital. When rushing to the hospital, M 
accidentally hit someone who ended up with a broken leg as a result of the accident. 
 
Clearly immoral condition: 
M was on their way to an appointment when they realised that they didn’t have their glasses. 
M was late and could not find their glasses quickly enough, so they decided to drive without 
them. When rushing to their appointment, M accidentally hit someone who ended up with a 
broken leg as a result of the accident. 
 
 
To what extent do you think that M’s action is morally acceptable? 
 
Unacceptable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Acceptable  
 
How sure are you about your judgement of the (un)acceptability of M’s actions? 
 
Not at all sure  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Very sure 
 
To what extent do you think that M is a moral person? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Very much 
 
Do you think that M is: 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree  
More likely a man  
More likely a woman   
Equally likely to be either a man or a woman  
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Appendix E: Materials Used in Studies 5 and 6 (Chapter 4) 
 
E.1. Scenarios Used in Studies 5 and 6  
 
Ambiguously immoral condition: 
When Mary was passing by, she saw a stranger having a heart attack. Mary tried to help this 
person and decided to drive them to the hospital. When rushing to the hospital, Mary 
accidentally hit someone who ended up with a broken leg as a result of the accident. 
 
Clearly immoral condition: 
Mary was on their way to an appointment when she realised that she didn’t have her glasses. 
Mary was late and could not find her glasses quickly enough, so she decided to drive without 
them. When rushing to her appointment, Mary accidentally hit someone who ended up with a 
broken leg as a result of the accident. 
 
Note. Target’s name and pronouns in the scenarios are changed to John (he/his/him) for male 
target condition to manipulate target gender in Study 6.  
 
 
 
To what extent do you think that Mary’s action is acceptable? 
Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable 
To what extent do you think that Mary’s action is moral?  
Not all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
To what extent do you think that Mary is a trustworthy person? 
Not all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
To what extent do you think that Mary is a reliable person? 
Not all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
To what extent do you think that Mary is a moral person? 
Not all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
What is your overall impression of Mary? 
Very negative  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very positive 
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E.2. Materials Used in Study 7 
 
Mary [John], who is a mother [father] of two children, has been a full-time employee in the 
finance department of an energy company, where she [he] has been working for five years. 
Mary [John] has recently been promoted to a management role, which resulted in a very 
hectic schedule for her [him]. Therefore, she [he] is not able to spare as much time for her 
[his] family as she [he] used to. For instance, she [he] missed her [his] kid’s school play last 
week since she [he] had to travel to another city for an important meeting with new business 
clients on the same day.  
 
To what extent do you think that Mary’s action is acceptable?  
Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable 
To what extent do you think that Mary is moral person? 
Not all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
To what extent do you think that Mary is competent person?  
Not all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
What is your overall impression of Mary?  
Not all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
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E.3. Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) 
 
Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in 
contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each 
statement using the following scale: 
(0) Strongly disagree; (1) disagree somewhat; (2) disagree slightly; (3) agree slightly; (4) 
agree somewhat; (5) agree strongly.  
 
1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he 
has the love of a woman.  
2. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favour 
them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality.” 
3. In a disaster, women ought not necessarily to be rescued before men.  
4. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.  
5. Women are too easily offended.  
6. People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a 
member of the other sex.  
7. Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men.  
8. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.  
9. Women should be cherished and protected by men.  
10. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.  
11. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.  
12. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.  
13. Men are complete without women.  
14. Women exaggerate problems they have at work.  
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15. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight 
leash.  
16. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being 
discriminated against.  
17. A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man.  
18. There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing men by seeming 
sexually available and then refusing male advances.  
19. Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.  
20. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing in order to provide financially 
for the women in their lives. 
21. Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.  
22. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good 
taste.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
 
Appendix F: Exploratory Analyses for Chapter 4   
 
F.1. Regression analysis for Study 5  
 
Table 17. Regression analysis predicting moral judgements when HS is a moderator in the model in 
Study 5. 
 
Predictor 
 
b 
b 
95%CI 
[LL, UL] 
 
beta 
 
Fit 
 
Difference 
(Intercept) 3.00 [2.83, 3.17]    
Hostile Sexism .001 [-0.09, 0.10] .00   
Moral Extremity 2.13** [1.92, 2.33] .71   
Participant Gender -.21* [-0.42, -.01] -.07   
    R2  = .496**  
    90% CI [0.44, 0.55]  
      
(Intercept) 2.98 [2.79, 3.18]    
Hostile Sexism -.03 [-0.20, 0.13] -.02   
Moral Extremity 2.16** [1.87,2.46] .72   
Participant Gender -.17 [-0.46, 0.11] -.06   
Hostile Sexism x 
Moral Extremity 
.12 [-0.07, 0.32] .06   
Hostile Sexism x 
Participant Gender 
-.05 [-0.25, 0.14] -.03   
Moral Extremity x 
Participant Gender 
-.07 [-0.48, 0.34] .02   
    R2  = .498** ΔR2  = .002 
    90% CI [0.44, 0.55] 90% CI [-0.005, 0.01] 
      
(Intercept) 2.98 [2.79, 3.18]    
Hostile Sexism -.03 [-0.23, 0.16] -.02   
Moral Extremity 2.16** [1.87,2.46] .72   
Participant Gender -.17 [-0.46, 0.12] -.06   
Hostile Sexism x 
Moral Extremity 
.12 [-0.17, 0.41] .06   
Hostile Sexism x 
Participant Gender 
-.06 [-0.33, 0.22] -.03   
Moral Extremity x 
Participant Gender 
-.07 [-0.48, 0.34] -.02   
Hostile Sexism x 
Moral Extremity x 
Participant Gender 
.003 [-0.38, 0.39] .001   
    R2  = .498** ΔR2  = .000 
    90% CI [0.44, 0.55] 90% CI [-0.001, 0.002] 
      
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
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F.2. Regression analysis for Study 6 
 
 
 
 
Predictor 
 
b 
b 
95%CI 
[LL, UL] 
 
beta 
 
r 
 
Fit 
 
Difference 
(Intercept) 3.00** [2.86, 3.15]     
Hostile Sexism .05 [-0.02, 0.12] .04 .06*   
Moral Ambiguity 2.34** [2.20, 2.50] .74 .74**   
Participant Gender -.16* [-0.31, -0.02] -.05 -.05   
Target Gender -.04 [-0.18, 0.11] -.01 -.01   
     R2  = .552**  
     90% CI [0.51, 0.59]  
       
(Intercept) 2.98 [2.80, 3.17]     
Hostile Sexism .06 [-0.07, 0.19] .04 .06*   
Moral Ambiguity 2.33** [2.08,2.59] .74 .74**   
Participant Gender -.19 [-0.42, 0.05] -.06 -.05   
Target Gender .09 [-0.16, 0.34] .03 -.01   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity 
-.02 [-0.16, 0.12] -.01 .03   
Hostile Sexism x 
Participant Gender 
.05 [-0.09, 0.18] .02 .07*   
Hostile Sexism x Target 
Gender 
-.05 [-0.18, 0.09] -.02 .03   
Moral ambiguity x 
Target Gender 
-.17 [-0.46, 0.12] -.04 .40**   
Participant Gender x 
Target Gender 
-.09 [-0.38, 0.20] -.03 -.03   
Moral Ambiguity x 
Participant Gender 
.16 [-0.13, 0.45] .04 .46**   
     R2  = .554** ΔR2  = .002 
     90% CI [0.52, 0.60] 90% CI [-0.003, 0.01] 
       
(Intercept) 3.02 [2.82, 3.22]     
Hostile Sexism .04 [-0.13, 0.22] .03 .06*   
Moral Ambiguity 2.25** [1.96, 2.55] .71 .74**   
Participant Gender -.25 [-0.51, 0.01] -.08 -.05   
Target Gender .01 [-0.28, 0.30] .004 -.01   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity 
-.04 [-0.29, 0.21] -.02 .03   
Hostile Sexism x 
Participant Gender 
.03 [-0.19, 0.25] .02 .07*   
Hostile Sexism x Target 
Gender 
.03 [-0.21, 0.26] .01 .03   
Moral ambiguity x 
Target Gender 
.002 [-0.43, 0.44] .001 .40**   
Participant Gender x 
Target Gender 
.05 [-0.34, 0.44] .01 -.03   
Moral Ambiguity x 
Participant Gender 
.30 [-0.10, 0.70] .08 .46**   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity x Participant 
Gender 
0.10 [-0.18, 0.37] .03 -.06   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity x Target 
Gender 
-.09 [-0.36, 0.19] -.03 .02   
Moral Ambiguity x 
Target Gender x 
Participant Gender 
-.31 [-0.90, 0.28] -.06 .26** 
 
 
  
Hostile Sexism x 
Participant Gender x 
Target Gender 
-.06 [-0.34, 0.22] -.02 .04   
     R2  = .555** ΔR2  = .001 
     90% CI [0.52, 0.60] 90% CI [-0.003, 0.005] 
       
Table 18. Regression analysis predicting moral judgments when HS is a moderator in the model in Study 6 
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Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b 
represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. r represents 
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. 
R2 requires a confidence coefficient of (1 - 2α) if we are to infer statistical significance (p < .05) from an interval 
that does not contain zero – i.e., 90% (not 95%) confidence intervals for R2 correspond to the traditional .05 
criterion of statistical significance. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Table 18 cont.)        
(Intercept) 3.02 [2.82, 3.22]     
Hostile Sexism .04 [-0.14, 0.22] .03 .06*   
Moral Ambiguity 2.25** [1.96, 2.55] .71 .74**   
Participant Gender -.25 [-0.51, 0.01] -.08 -.05   
Target Gender .01 [-0.28, 0.30] .004 -.01   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity 
-.03 [-0.32, 0.26] -.01 .03   
Hostile Sexism x 
Participant Gender 
.04 [-0.21, 0.28] .02 .07*   
Hostile Sexism x Target 
Gender 
.03 [-0.23, 0.30] .01 .03   
Moral ambiguity x 
Target Gender 
.002 [-0.43, 0.44] .001 .40**   
Participant Gender x 
Target Gender 
.05 [-0.34, 0.44] .01 -.03   
Moral Ambiguity x 
Participant Gender 
.30 [-0.10, 0.70] .08 .46**   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity x Participant 
Gender 
0.08 [-0.29, 0.46] .03 -.06   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity x Target 
Gender 
-.10 [-0.51, 0.31] -.03 .02   
Moral Ambiguity x 
Target Gender x 
Participant Gender 
-.31 [-0.90, 0.28] -.06 .26** 
 
 
  
Hostile Sexism x 
Participant Gender x 
Target Gender 
-.07 [-0.44, 0.30] -.02 .04   
Hostile Sexism x Moral 
Ambiguity x Participant 
Gender x Target Gender  
.03 [-0.53, 0.58] .01 -.05   
     R2  = .555** ΔR2  < .001 
     90% CI [0.52, 0.60] 90% CI [-0.001, 0.001] 
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F.3. Decomposing the three-way interaction in Study 5 (Chapter 4)  
 
We decomposed the marginally significant three way interaction further for 
exploratory purposes. To do so, we ran a moderation analysis to test whether the effect of 
moral ambiguity (X) on moral judgements (Y) was moderated by benevolent sexism (M) for 
each gender group separately. We used Model 1 in the PROCESS macro created by Hayes 
(2016) entering benevolent sexism as a centred continuous variable.  
For female participants, the overall model was significant, F(3,230)=73.930, R2 = 
.491, p <.001. The main effect of benevolent sexism score on moral judgement was not 
significant, b=.045, t(230)=.375, p =.708. There was a positive and significant main effect of 
moral ambiguity on moral judgements, b=2.101, t(230)=14.442, p <.001, but the predicted 
two-way interaction between moral ambiguity and benevolent sexism was not significant, b=-
.064, t(230)=-.406, p =.685.  
For male participants, the overall model was significant, F(3,200)=80.546, R2 = .547, 
p <.001. The main effect of benevolent sexism on moral judgements was positive and 
significant, b=.456, t(200)=4.433, p <.001. There was also a positive and significant main 
effect of moral ambiguity on moral judgements, b=2.133, t(200)=14.685, p <.001. Finally, 
the predicted interaction between moral ambiguity and benevolent sexism was negative and 
significant, b=-.428, t(200)=-2.845, p =.005. However, the interaction pattern was not as 
predicted, as it indicated that the higher the benevolent sexism was the higher the moral 
judgements of female targets in non-ambiguous condition (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 11. Moderating effect of benevolent sexism on moral judgements at the levels of moral 
ambiguity for male participants in Study 6. 
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